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Project execution cost and safety have been traditionally approached as 
independent areas of study. The argument for a separate treatment is that the most effective 
way to improve safety is to add safety barriers, resulting in added scope and increased 
costs. However, a novelty view of project planning as an integrator of cost and safety 
outcomes of execution demonstrates both objectives may simultaneously be achieved. 
This study proposes a method to characterize the socio-technical system of project 
execution to assess the impact of planning on cost and safety. The effect of additional 
planning is studied in the proposed model to find optimum levels that render economic 
value and yet improve safety. In the absence of project data for analysis, and because of 
the fundamental similarities with regular projects, interventions in industrial or process 
facilities (i.e., maintenance, modifications, repairs, and tests) are studied as small-scale or 
pseudo projects. The analysis shows effective planning efforts during interventions can 
reduce the likelihood of safety incidents and the expected execution cost. 
Keywords: MMRT Interventions, Small-Scale Projects, Bayesian Believe Networks, 
Socio-Technical System 
































I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my committee 
chair, Dr. Ivan Damnjanovic, who provided guidance and encouragement during my 
doctoral study. It has been a great honor and privilege to have worked with him. 
Also, I would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Ali Mostafavidarani, Dr. 
Luca Quadrifoglio, and Dr. Stratos Pistikopoulos, for their valuable comments and 
suggestions on my dissertation.  
Finally, I want to offer special thanks to Dr. M. Sam Mannan, who, although no 
longer with us, played an essential role in this study's initiation and continues to inspire by 














CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES 
 
Contributors 
This work was supported by a dissertation committee consisting of Professor Ivan 
Damnjanovic [advisor], Professor Ali Mostafavidarani and Professor Luca Quadrifoglio of 
the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Professor Stratos 
Pistikopoulos of the Department of Chemical Engineering. 




Graduate study was supported by a fellowship from Texas A&M University, The 
Williams F. Urban ‘66/Beavers Heavy Construction Scholarship and The Williams 









TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. ii 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................. iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... iv 
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES .........................................................v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................x 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... xii 
CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................1 
1.1 Research Goal ....................................................................................................3 
1.2 Research Objectives ...........................................................................................3 
1.3 Research Delineation .........................................................................................3 
1.3.1 Phases of the Project Life Cycle addressed in the Study ....................3 
1.3.2 Aspects of Maintenance Optimization addressed in the Study ...........5 
1.4 Research Contributions ......................................................................................6 
CHAPTER II : BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW ..............................8 
2.1 Topic 1: Planning as Means to Reduce Uncertainty In Project            
Execution ...................................................................................................11 
2.2 Topic 2: Pseudo-Projects for Representation and Analysis of                      
Full-Scale Projects .....................................................................................13 
2.2.1 Planning and the Cost Outcomes in Pseudo-Projects .......................14 
vii 
 
2.2.2 Planning and the Safety Outcomes in Pseudo-Projects ....................21 
2.3 Topic 3: Characterization of Pseudo-Projects For Analysis of  Cost                
& Safety .....................................................................................................25 
2.3.1 Bayesian Reasoning ..........................................................................25 
2.3.2 Causal Networks ...............................................................................26 
2.3.3 Bayesian Methods .............................................................................26 
2.3.4 Bayesian Networks ...........................................................................28 
2.4 Summary of Literature Review ........................................................................33 
CHAPTER III : METHODOLOGY ............................................................................35 
3.1 Conceptual Framework ....................................................................................35 
3.1.1 Levels in Management of Uncertainty ..............................................35 
3.2 Research Method .............................................................................................38 
3.2.1 Exploratory Analysis ........................................................................38 
3.2.2 Modeling of the Socio-Technical System .........................................38 
3.2.3 Development of the Causal Model implemented with a BBN .........39 
3.2.4 Development of Node Probability Tables (NPT’s): .........................40 
3.2.5 Development of the Method to Measure the Effect of         
Additional Planning ............................................................................40 
3.2.6 Plot of Intensity of Planning against Cost and Safety           
Outcomes of Execution ......................................................................41 
CHAPTER IV : MODEL FORMULATION ...............................................................42 
4.1 The Project Cost Layer (PC-L) or Risk-Based Cost Outcome ......................44 
4.1.1 Project Cost Layer Alternatives (ai) ..................................................48 
4.1.2 Project Cost Layer Outcomes (Ɵj , Ok) .............................................49 
4.1.3 Project Cost Layer Utilities ...............................................................50 
4.2 The Intermediate Layer (Int-L) ........................................................................50 
4.2.1 From Conceptual Cause-Effect Model to BBN ................................54 
4.2.3 A Numerical Example of Propagation of Probabilities        
throughout the BBN ...........................................................................56 
4.3 The Project Safety Layer (PS-L) ......................................................................60 
4.4 Planning as the Linkage of Cost (PC-L) and Safety (PS-L) ............................61 
viii 
 
CHAPTER V : CASE STUDY ....................................................................................64 
5.1 The Need for Maintenance on a Process Safety Valve (PSV) .........................65 
5.2 The Execution of Maintenance on a Process Safety Valve (PSV) ..................66 
5.3 Modeling of the Cost Layer (PC-L ) or Risk-Based Execution Cost ..............67 
5.3.1 The Execution Budget.......................................................................67 
5.3.2 Utilities resulting from the Resource Utilization Strategy ................68 
5.4 Modeling of the Intermediate Layer (Int-L) or Causal Network .....................71 
5.5 Effect of Planning in WAI=WAD ...................................................................73 
5.6 The Bayesian Believe Network (BBN)............................................................75 
CHAPTER VI : ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.............................77 
6.1 Effect of Planning on Safety ............................................................................77 
6.2 Effect of Planning on Execution Cost ..............................................................79 
6.2.1 Minimum Effective Improvement from Planning ............................81 
6.2.1.1 Planning Effort at No Cost .....................................................82 
6.2.1.2 Cost of Planning Effort at 50% of Original                  
Planning Budget .....................................................................82 
6.2.1.3 Cost of Planning Effort at 100% of Original                 
Planning Budget .....................................................................83 
6.2.2 Improvement in VOI based on Category of Influencing           
Factors ........................................................................................................84 
CHAPTER VII : MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY ....................87 
7.2 Applicability of the Analysis Method in Construction ....................................87 
7.3 Managerial Influence on the Analysis .............................................................88 
7.4 Management Experience to Improve Safety and Reduce Cost ........................89 
7.5 Maximizing the Value of Planning in Construction ........................................90 
CHAPTER V : SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH .......93 
5.1 Summary ..........................................................................................................93 
5.2 Conclusions ......................................................................................................93 












LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
 
Figure 1. 1 Phases of the Project Life Cycle addressed in the study .................................. 4 
Figure 1. 2 Classification of Maintenance Optimization Models ....................................... 5 
Figure 1. 3 Relationship between Safety and Maintenance ................................................ 6 
 
Figure 2. 1 Roadmap of the Literature Review ................................................................. 10 
Figure 2. 2 Structure and Notation of a typical decision tree ........................................... 16 
Figure 2. 3 Bayesian Network for events A, B and C....................................................... 29 
Figure 2. 4 Bayesian Network for events D, E and F ....................................................... 30 
Figure 2. 5 Bayesian Network for events G, H, and I ....................................................... 31 
 
Figure 3. 1 The Management of Uncertainty on Cost and Safety during Execution ........ 37 
Figure 3. 2 Representation of the Expected Results from the Analysis............................ 41 
 
Figure 4. 1 Decomposition of an Intervention (MMRT) into Layers ............................... 43 
Figure 4. 2 Decision Tree for the estimation of VOI ........................................................ 45 
Figure 4. 3 Preliminary Identification of Safety Influencing Factors (SIF’s) in the      
Intermediate Layer (Int-L) ......................................................................................... 51 
Figure 4. 4  Causal view of Safety Risks .......................................................................... 55 
Figure 4. 5 Examples of the BBN branches developed with the Causal view of          
Safety Risks ............................................................................................................... 56 
xi 
 
Figure 4. 6 Section of the BBN affecting node “Violation during Execution” (M) ......... 57 
Figure 4. 7 Conversion of a Fault Tree into Causal Network Nodes ................................ 61 
Figure 4. 8 Final Model as Formulated ............................................................................. 63 
 
Figure 5. 1 Schematic Diagram of a Conventional Spring-loaded PSV ........................... 64 
Figure 5. 2 Typical location of a PSV within a process.................................................... 65 
Figure 5. 3 Categorized Safety Influencing Factors (SIF’s) of a PSV Maintenance ........ 72 
Figure 5. 4 Effect of Planning on the Quality of Plan P(WAI=WAD) ............................. 75 
 
Figure 6. 1  Quality of Plan and Probability of Accidents vs Number of Tests     
Performed .................................................................................................................. 78 
Figure 6. 2 VOI for Additional Planning costing 50% of the Planning Budget ............... 80 
Figure 6. 3  Minimum Improvement needed from Planning Efforts to render                  
(+) VOI ...................................................................................................................... 82 
Figure 6. 4 Cost and Safety performance against Intensity of Planning ........................... 84 
 
Figure 7. 1 Simplified Representation of the Uncertainty Region that renders        
optimum Safety & Cost Results from Planning ........................................................ 91 
Figure 7. 2 Simplified Representation of the Region with Safety & Cost-Efficient 





LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
 
Table 2. 1 Release Mitigation Measures (adapted from AICHE (Prugh &              
Johnson, 1988)). ........................................................................................................ 23 
Table 2. 2 Causal Factors of Accidents Allocated to Categories (Hale et al., 1998) ........ 24 
 
Table 4. 1 Conditional Probability Table for node “Violation during Execution” ........... 57 
Table 4. 2 Conditional Probability Table for node “Mistake during Execution” ............. 58 
 
Table 5. 1 Estimated Original and Adjusted Labor Costs for a PSV Maintenance .......... 68 
Table 5.2 Effect of Risk on the Cost of PSV Maintenance under “Minimal         
Resources” Strategy ................................................................................................... 69 
Table 5.3 Effect of Risk on the Cost of PSV Maintenance  under “Excess          
Resources” Strategy ................................................................................................... 71 
 






CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION 
 
The assessment of uncertainty and management of risk is essential in the life cycle 
of capital projects. In the construction phase, the workforce's interactions, hazardous 
materials, and equipment create additional uncertainty sources that affect project 
performance. Under uncertainty, decisions about safety measures (as well as duration, 
quality, or cost control) are often based on the project manager's experience and judgment, 
which has proven inadequate in the past. Therefore, there is an increasing need for more 
reliable methods based on decision analysis, probability theory, and mathematics for 
addressing uncertainty and managing risk in project environments (Damnjanovic & 
Reinschmidt, 2020). 
In construction project management, planning is known for its ability to influence 
uncertainty, and it is reflected in the efficient use of project resources. The cost influence 
over time curve that depicts the impact of pre-execution decisions on project cost outcomes 
establishes the intrinsic value of planning (Baker, Murphy, & Fisher, 2008). However, the 
value of planning in projects does not only come in the form of cost outcomes. For example, 
it could also be expressed as safety outcomes (Damnjanovic & Røed, 2016). Cost, duration, 
and quality are the three primary measures of performance in executing capital projects 
(Olsen, 1971; Reiss, 2007), leaving safety as a desirable but detached objective. A 
significant difficulty integrating execution safety into project management resides in the 
fact that it requires an industry-specific approach or adherence to prescriptive rules and 
regulations. Different objectives, methodologies, applicable laws, and procedures have 
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deterred most integration efforts (Badri, Gbodossou, & Nadeau, 2012). However, it is yet 
feasible to view safety in a project management context to facilitate its integration into the 
discipline and assess planning as a potential contributor. 
Studying management aspects of construction projects demands access to project 
data not readily available to scholars (Martínez-Rojas, Marín, & Vila, 2016). The fact that 
practitioners have a slight predisposition to publish their findings amplifies the noted 
restriction. Hence, the search for an alternative method to study execution safety from a 
project management perspective (in the absence of project data) led to industrial or process 
facilities interventions. Once constructed and commissioned, these facilities are constantly 
subjected to intervention activities such as maintenance, modifications, repairs, and testing 
(MMRT interventions) (J. E. Vinnem & Røed, 2015).  A closer look at these interventions 
shows they are endeavors with a defined scope. Also, they are performed with limited 
resources. These features (defined scope, duration, and budget) are characteristic 
conditions of projects (PMI, 2008). Therefore, the manifest similarity opens up the 
possibility to use interventions as scaled-down models of capital projects.  
The present study proposes a risk analysis methodology (using MMRT 
interventions as pseudo projects) to quantify planning levels that benefit the cost and the 
safety outcomes of execution. With a Bayesian Believe Network (BBN) depicting the 
socio-technical system (STS) of a pseudo project, the proposed method integrates safety 
and cost. The economic value of additional planning is measured with Decision Analysis 
(DA). The plan’s quality is assessed with the concepts of Work-as-Imagined (WAI) and 
Work-as-Done. Finally, the probability of incidents/accidents during execution is 
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estimated with Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). A case study of an MMRT intervention in a 
processing facility illustrates the methodology. 
1.1 Research Goal  
This dissertation aims to develop a risk analysis methodology that quantifies 
optimum levels of planning efforts that simultaneously improve cost and safety outcomes 
of execution in MMRT interventions. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
I. Formulate a concept that relates cost and safety outcomes of execution during 
MMRT’s interventions 
II. Characterize the socio-technical system of MMRT interventions  
III. Identify a method able to measure the intensity of planning 
IV. Determine optimum levels of planning efforts that benefit cost and safety 
outcomes of execution during MMRT interventions 
1.3 Research Delineation 
1.3.1 Phases of the Project Life Cycle addressed in the Study 
The present study highlights the role of planning in reducing uncertainty and 
managing risk throughout the life cycle of capital projects. Due to the growth in uncertainty 
sources, this study makes a case for the paramount role of planning during the execution 
phase (detail design, procurement, and construction). However, as shown in Figure 1.1, 
this research proposes an alternative method that uses activities performed outside the 




Figure 1. 1 Phases of the Project Life Cycle addressed in the study 
 
Although the research motivation is to understand a phenomenon occurring in the 
execution phase, the methodology aims at activities performed in the operation phase. 
Using pseudo projects (MMRT interventions) for analysis, a time-independent method is 
proposed to assess safety and cost. Safety outcomes are measured as the probability of 
accidents/incidents and cost outcomes as the expected value of planning. Both outcomes 
of execution resulting from different planning levels are simultaneously captured, reported, 
and analyzed. 
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1.3.2 Aspects of Maintenance Optimization addressed in the Study 
Maintenance optimization is a knowledge area that develops and analyzes 
qualitative and quantitative models to optimize policies, timing, or maintenance frequency 
(Sharma, Yadava, & Deshmukh, 2011). A generic classification framework of maintenance 
optimization models (Figure 1.2 ) shows factors that influence the way these models are 
built (Van Horenbeek, Pintelon, & Muchiri, 2010). 
 
Figure 1. 2 Classification of Maintenance Optimization Models 
(adapted from “Maintenance optimization models and criteria” Van Horenbeek, et al) 
 
Often driven by corporate policy, optimization criteria are diverse and may involve 
increased plant utilization, reduced cost, increased profitability, or increased work safety 
6 
 
(Wilson, 2002). When safety is an optimization criterion, it is necessary to understand how 
it relates to maintenance (or other interventions aiming to increase an asset's service life). 
The referred relationship is characterized by three elements, as shown in Figure 1.3 (Vatn 
& Aven, 2010): 
 
Figure 1. 3 Relationship between Safety and Maintenance 
 
The present work explores the third element of association between safety and 
maintenance: "Accidents that occur during interventions." However, the focus of this study 
is not a maintenance policy. Rather than optimizing policy, timing, or frequency with safety 
criteria, this study aims to improve the execution itself (Figure 1.2). Whether the 
intervention has a preventive or corrective nature, this study is centered on the intervention 
crews' actions. 
1.4 Research Contributions  
The present study brings two major contributions to the field of construction 
engineering and management: 
Maintenance will 
normally increase 
reliability and hence 
the safety level 












I. This study proposes planning as a contributor to project outcomes beyond cost. The 
study is narrowed down and conducted on MMRT interventions (pseudo projects) 
where cost and safety are seen as incompatible objectives. However, the proposition 
brings a novelty view of planning as potentially beneficial to cost and safety in 
capital projects' execution phase. 
II. This study introduces a new view of MMRT interventions in process plants. In this 
study, maintenance, modifications, repairs, and tests are treated as pseudo projects 







CHAPTER II : BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Project cost and safety have been traditionally treated separately, resulting in their 
respective areas of study to follow independent paths. Nowadays, it is generally accepted 
that improving one implies the other's deterioration (e.g., investing in safety measures 
increases the total execution cost). The idea has kept cost and safety apart in the industry 
and academia. Although cost is the natural driver of project management decisions, a free-
from-accidents execution remains a paramount objective because of humanitarian and 
economic reasons (Asfahl & Rieske, 2010; Everett & Frank Jr, 1996). This scenario poses 
a challenge to find non-apparent relationships between cost and safety that would allow 
optimization in both outcomes. 
Achieving safety in project execution requires going beyond the implementation of 
safety barriers. The human interaction with equipment, materials, and site conditions 
implies an increased level of uncertainty to be overcome. Thus, an effective treatment can 
only derive from identifying every Safety Influencing Factor (SIF), understanding how 
each one affects the socio-technical system in the execution of projects, and reshaping such 
influences.  
The literature review discusses three essential topics that emphasize the need to find 
an analysis method able to combine cost and safety outcomes of execution and measure 
how these are affected by planning (See Figure 2.1). Topic 1, "Planning as Means to 
Reduce Uncertainty in Project Execution" defines the purpose of project planning and 
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highlights the absence of propositions that associate it with safety. Because of the 
challenges of studying full-size projects, the topic introduces using alternative 
methods. Topic 2, "Pseudo-Projects for the Analysis of Planning" discusses the use of 
pseudo projects such as MMRT's in place of full-size projects. The topic covers decision 
analysis tools for measuring cost outcomes. It then explores previous studies that suggest 
that safety in pseudo projects can be influenced by planning. The topic concludes with the 
need to find a method capable of combing cost and safety in one model. Topic 3, 
"Characterization of Pseudo-Project STS for Analysis of Cost & Safety" discusses 
causal networks as an alternative for modeling the socio-technical system of an MMRT 
intervention. The topic discusses Bayesian Believe Networks' capabilities (BBN's) to 
represent and combine cost and safety outcomes of execution in one model. Finally, the 
topic argues how planning introduces evidence in the model, which is reflected in cost and 


















Figure 2. 1 Roadmap of the Literature Review 
Planning as means to Reduce 
Uncertainty in Project Execution 
 
Planning is performed to answer: 
what/when/how/who of execution 
Planning can improve COST outcomes 
Planning can improve SAFETY 
outcomes of execution 
Pseudo Projects for Representation and 
Analysis of Full-scale Projects 
 
Pseudo projects can be used 
to analyze the effect of 
Planning on COST outcomes 
Pseudo projects can be used 
to analyze the effect of 
Planning on SAFETY outcomes 
 
Characterization of the STS of Pseudo 
Projects for Analysis of Cost & Safety 
Causal networks (e.g., Bayesian 
Believe Networks) can combine 
COST & SAFETY outcomes of 




Cost Influence over Time 
Not Evident: 
 Safety is not a Project 
Management knowledge 
area. 
 Safety is acknowledged only 
as a contractual 
requirement to be included 
in project plans. 
Pseudo Projects (i.e., Maintenance, 
Modifications, Repairs & Tests) are 
endeavors with limited SCOPE-BUDGET-
SCHEDULE 
Required: 
 Estimation of 
Value of 
Planning 
 Estimation of 




 Incorporation of SAFETY Influencing 
Factors (SIF) in the model 
 Representation of Quality of Plan prior to 
execution 
 Representation of Planning efforts as 
means to introduce evidence on SIF’s. 
 Assessment of changes in Quality of Plan 
as result of planning. 
 Safety Incidents occur in Pseudo Projects 
 Prior Research points at Deficient Planning as a 
major contributor to Safety Incidents 
Required: 
 Estimation of SAFETY outcomes 
as a result of Planning  
Uncertainty Analysis 
on a Full-scale 
project represents a 
major challenge 
COST & SAFETY 
need to be 
characterized and 







2.1 Topic 1: Planning as Means to Reduce Uncertainty In Project Execution 
The natural variability observed in most of its processes and the possibility of 
discrete adverse events explain uncertainty in project settings for which planning is in 
place. In other words,  planning arises from the concept of uncertainty (Laufer & Tucker, 
1987). By definition, planning is the decision-making process made ahead of action that 
involves designing a chosen future and the effective ways of accomplishing it (Ackoff, 
1970). Depending on the audience, the concept of planning has subtle differences. For 
corporate managers, it means “predict and prepare” or forecasting the company’s 
environment, identifying opportunities and threats, and deciding on the path and the means 
to achieve it. For project managers, on the other hand, the goals are specific within the 
company’s strategic plan. The goals are even more specific for construction managers and 
imply a detailed action plan.     
The role of planning in the project life cycle is essential to reduce uncertainty 
because it answers the "what", "how", "when", and "who" (scope, method, 
timing/sequence, and resources). In the early stages, uncertainty management determines 
the project's ability to survive (Milosevic & Srivannaboon, 2006). Here, planning allows 
owners to develop sufficient strategic information for addressing risk and decide to commit 
resources to maximize the chance for a successful project (Gibson & Haggard, 1994). 
However, planning turns crucial in the execution phase. The project environment during 
detailed design and construction (i.e., engineers/designers, weather, market conditions, 
clients, suppliers, subcontractors, and resource inputs) contributes even further to the 
already increased uncertainty. Because of the direct influence on the definition, planning 
plays a crucial role in project success. A high level of definition in a project (reduced 
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uncertainty about the scope of work) is considered the highest governing factor of project 
outcomes (duration, cost, and quality) (Bingham & Gibson Jr, 2017; Cho & Gibson, 2001; 
Neal, 1995; Samset & Volden, 2016). Previous studies have shown the level of scope 
definition, and project success (in terms of duration, cost, and design capacity achieved) 
are statistically related (Hamilton & Gibson, 1996).  As observed, although planning is 
associated with project success (in terms of cost outcomes), it is yet to be associated with 
safety.      
From the concepts described above, planning and its ability to reduce uncertainty 
should improve not only the cost but also the safety outcomes of execution. However, this 
ability is not evident because project execution safety is not closely related to project 
management. The search for improved safety outcome of execution has been an ongoing 
but separate effort that covered practices, programs, safety culture, constructability, 
climate, owners’ commitment, and design for safety (Siyuan, Awolusi, & Marks, 2017). 
Theoretical and empirical relationships between job site fatalities and the concept of design 
for construction safety have been proposed (Gambatese, Behm, & Rajendran, 2008; Hinze 
& Wiegand, 1992). Other advances in project safety include Site Layout Planning (SLP), 
which is considered to affect productivity and safety (Anumba & Bishop, 1997; El-Rayes 
& Khalafallah, 2005; RazaviAlavi & AbouRizk, 2017). Furthermore, project management 
as a discipline mostly acknowledges safety as a contractual requirement to be addressed in 
the cost estimation, procurement, and human resource management plans (PMI, 2008). 
As observed, planning's ability to reduce uncertainty and simultaneously improve 
cost and safety outcomes of execution is apparent but unexplored. This phenomenon's 
study is desirable and justified because of its potential benefits to the project management 
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field. Notwithstanding, project data is needed for this type studies can be challenging to 
obtain due to limitations imposed by its proprietary nature. This scenario drives research 
toward alternative or indirect methods of analysis. 
2.2 Topic 2: Pseudo-Projects for Representation and Analysis of Full-Scale Projects 
Among the most common limitations in the study of capital projects is the 
availability of actual project data. Unless there is an alignment of interests, owners, and 
contractors in public and private ventures are unenthusiastic about sharing data with 
academia. Nevertheless, it is still possible to utilize alternative methods of analysis that can 
raise awareness and leverage the participation of industry players in further research. 
Interventions in industrial settings can be treated as small-scale or pseudo projects. 
Once reliability and maintainability engineering has determined the need, an MMRT 
intervention is planned. A typical preparation involves organizing to define lines of 
responsibility and authority, followed by estimation and approval of resources (Townsend, 
1992). By definition, a project is a limited resource endeavor undertaken to create a unique 
product, service, or result (PMI, 2008). Consequently, an MMRT intervention fits (on a 
reduced scale) within a project's definition. However, these interventions are not widely 
seen as projects because of underlying reasons that include functional differentiation. For 
example, labor costs in maintenance activities (highly scrutinized in regular-size projects) 
are accounted for and lumped in calculating revenue expenditure (REVEX). Moreover, the 
time allocated to perform an MMRT intervention is sometimes unconstrained, leading to 
inefficiencies not allowed in regular-size projects.   
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2.2.1 Planning and the Cost Outcomes in Pseudo-Projects 
Understanding the influence of planning in the cost outcomes of execution requires 
measuring its benefits. Also, because planning is about pursuing additional information, 
the decision needs to be justified, and Decision Analysis (DA) provides an indicator that 
tells when it is worth doing so. The indicator is called Value of Information (VOI) and is 
used to estimate the value of planning. 
2.2.1.1 Decision Trees for the Estimation of Value of Planning 
Uncertainty, both aleatory (due to random behavior) and epistemic (due to the 
limitation of data and models), is unavoidable in engineering applications and must be 
managed (Ang & Tang, 2007). Engineering decisions aim for optimal usage of resources. 
This goal can be achieved by balancing costs (including upset costs) and benefits using risk 
and probability analysis (Rogers, 2018). Engineering decisions under uncertainty regularly 
require the valuation of several alternatives. Here, every alternative has an estimated 
outcome range distribution and a probability of occurrence distribution. Decision Trees 
(DT) provides a method that considers the value and probability of each alternative to 
support an optimum decision based on the maximum expected utility (Jordaan, 2005). 
The concept of Decision Trees allows an unconventional view of project planning. 
In the context of decision analysis, testing refers to the process capable of revealing the 
state of a variable of interest (Jensen, 2001) and implies the usage of resources such as 
time, workforce, equipment, and tools. On the other hand, planning in a project setting is a 
process that determines what should be done, how it will be performed, when it is best to 
be executed, and who is most suitable to do it (Laufer & Tucker, 1987). In accomplishing 
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this goal, the project team investigates for revealing the state of those factors capable of 
affecting execution. Therefore, it can safely be assumed that: 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ≅ 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 
Action decisions are different from test decisions. The best course of action can be 
determined with a DT based on the maximum EVM that relies on existing information. On 
the other hand, testing can be another course of action. However, before proceeding with 
testing, it is rational to determine whether spending resources on these efforts are 
worthwhile. The Value of Information (VOI) or value of planning allows making such 
determination. 
2.2.1.1.1 Decision Trees 
Decision trees provide a graphic way to organize information needed for an 
important decision. They show the alternatives to be considered, the utility values of 
alternative outcomes based on preferences and perceived value of the decision-maker 
(DM), and the probabilities of outcomes for each alternative. In order to identify a sensible 
decision, the DM needs to specify two model descriptors: 
(1) A quantifier of the consequences of choosing each decision d. This can be a loss 
function L(d,θ) specifying in monetary terms how much will be lost if decision d is 
made and the future outcome is θ. 
Where:  
d ∈ D (Decision Space) and θ ∈ Θ (Space of all Possible Outcomes) 
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(2) A quantifier of the subjective probability distribution over the possible outcomes. 
This is a probability mass function p(θ) given the probabilities (using facts, science, 
or expert judgment) of the different outcomes θ before decision d is made. 
 
A typical decision tree (Figure 2.2) will have the following structure and notation: 
 
 
Figure 2. 2 Structure and Notation of a typical decision tree 
 
Where: 
ai = The ith alternative that belongs to alternative set A 
ɵj = The jth outcome that belongs to outcome set Ɵ 
tk  = The kth alternative that belongs to testing (planning) alternative set T  
Zl  = The lth outcome that belongs to testing (planning) outcome set L 
U(ai, ɵj) = Utility value corresponding to alternative ai and outcome ɵj    
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U(tk, zl, ai, ɵj) = Utility value that depends on test tk and corresponding experimental 
outcome Zl, alternative ai  and outcome ɵj  
P(ɵj | ai) = Probability of outcome ɵj given alternative ai 
P(ɵj | tk ,zl ,ai) = Probability of outcome ɵj given alternative ai, test tk and test outcome zl 
 
  When outcomes associated with alternatives in a DT are expressed in terms of 
monetary value, the decision criteria commonly used is the Expected Monetary Value 
(EMV).  If 𝑣  is the monetary value of the j-th outcome associated to the i-th alternative, 
then; the corresponding probability is 𝑝  and the EMV of alternative 𝑎  is defined by: 
  
 𝐸[𝑎 ] = 𝑝  𝑣  (1) 
In this case, the expected value of alternative 𝑎 is the weighted average of the 
possible values of 𝑎 , In DT analysis, the optimal decision alternative based on Max 
EMV will contain the greatest expected value as shown in equation (2) (Ross, 2006). 
 𝑑[𝑎 ] = max 𝑝  𝑣  (2) 
 
2.2.1.1.2 The Value of Information (VOI) or Value of Planning Efforts 
Terminal analysis of DT’s implies additional information is available. However, 
our interest is to determine whether additional information should be pursued, and it is 
known as Pre-Posterior Analysis. The indicator that helps determine when it is worth 
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pursuing additional information (required for deciding) is called the Value of Information 
(VOI). The VOI estimation relies upon the protocol defined by the Decision Analysis (DA). 
A view to the origins of the VOI concept shows the use of probability to guide a 
person's life was acknowledged by Marcus Tullius Cicero (63 BC). The relative frequency 
view of probability was developed in the latter part of the 19th century by Venn (1888) and 
Mises (1957). However, in the '50s and '60s, the benefits of further information in decision-
making are formally studied (Howard, 1966; Raiffa, 1968; Schlaifer, 1959). As found in 
the Society of Petroleum Engineers Library, Grayson’s work on VOI methods and 
Bayesian Statistics (Grayson, 1962) is the first publication. A series of relevant work would 
follow by authors such as Dougherty (1971) and Warren's "Development Decision: Value 
of information" presented at the Hydrocarbon Economics and Evaluation Symposium 
(1983) (Bratvold, Bickel, & Lohne, 2009).  
The decision to pursue additional information needs to be justified. Any 
information-gathering action (planning work) must produce a result that is observable, 
relevant to the uncertainty of interest, material (it has the possibility of changing the 
alternative selected), and, finally, economic (finding the result does not cost more than it 
could be worth) (Howard, 1966).  
The VOI or value of planning has as the ultimate goal to determine whether to 
obtain additional information. With the DA approach, the cost-effectiveness of additional 
information gathering can be an alternative to be judged compared to the original 
alternatives (to be judged without considering additional information). The question is 
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whether or not the cost of additional information can provide sufficient value in lowering 
the uncertainty to offset the cost of gathering the information. 
If the utility under assessment is monetary, the VOI can be measured by:    
 𝑉𝑂𝐼 = 𝐸(𝑡 )  −  𝐸(𝑎∗) (3) 
 
Where: 
𝐸(𝑡 ) = Expected monetary value of the Test alternative (information gathering)  
excluding the cost of the experiment 
𝐸(𝑎∗) = Expected monetary value of the optimal alternative under No-Test  
If the VOI > cost of test, the test (information gathering alternative) should 
prevail and be selected.  
Finally, the VOI is subject to the limiting value of perfect information (VPI) in a 
perfect test (PT) with 100% reliability. The VPI sets an upper cost limit for the information 
gathering alternative. The VPI can be measured by:  
 𝑉𝑃𝐼 = 𝐸(𝑃𝑇) − 𝐸(𝑎∗) (4) 
 
Where: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑇) = Expected monetary value of the perfect test 
𝐸(𝑎∗) = Expected monetary value of the No-Test alternative 
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The process industry is not different from any other field where decisions need to 
be made. For example, offshore exploration geoscientists and reservoir engineers 
constantly look for information to improve decision-making. In this context, it may be 
accepted that any additional information can only be beneficial. However, the VOI 
technique provides insight on the cost of obtaining information; therefore, this tool can 
assess whether the additional information is genuinely beneficial. Published works on VOI 
propose that additional information (in the form of a test) can only increase the chance of 
success (Ballin, Ward, Whorlow, & Khan, 2005; Head, 1999; Waggoner, 2002). However, 
this proposition's absolute nature cannot stand a rigorous analysis because there are criteria 
for any information-gathering activity to be considered beneficial or value-adding 
(Howard, 1966). 
The VOI method is appropriate to support and direct strategic decisions in many 
types of operations. The process industry brings a significant opportunity for valuable use 
of this method. The “Digital Oil Field” (Jacobs & Ward, 2006) relies in the use of a 
continuous flow of data that decision-makers will have to deal with effectively. Although 
VOI analysis is not routinely used in the process industry, many operators claim they 
follow the VOI criteria by monotonically increasing the volume of information. As shown, 
increased confidence or reduced uncertainty has no value by itself.  
2.2.1.2 The Appropriateness (Quality) of an Execution Plan 
A fundamental component in the DT is the outcome related to the execution plan's 
appropriateness. This outcome represents the documentation quality (e.g., work plans, 
drawings, procedures, and permits) the field team has before starting the work. The 
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relevance resides in its capability to identify extreme theoretical cases: where quality is 
perfect, eliminating uncertainty, or quality is entirely faulty, leading to a maximum 
uncertainty about conditions before execution. The plan's quality or appropriateness can be 
represented employing the concepts of Work-As-Imagined (WAI) and Work-As-Done.  
Work-As-Imagined (WAI) refers to the rational representation the execution leader 
has about how the workers or laborers "should" perform the assigned work. WAI is a 
central instrument in designing or improving a system as it allows us to imagine how the 
work should be done. Its importance becomes evident when managing or planning 
operations. Work-As-Done, on the other hand, refers to how the assigned work or task "is" 
actually performed in the field (Hollnagel, 2014).  The proximity of WAI to WAD arises 
as a valid way to measure a plan's appropriateness. 
2.2.2 Planning and the Safety Outcomes in Pseudo-Projects 
From the concept of planning as capable of reducing uncertainty before execution, 
it can be inferred that planning would benefit not only the cost but also safety. The idea 
resides in that planning can help predict and prepare against unforeseeable events that may 
lead to incidents or accidents. Nevertheless, to understand the potential benefits of planning 
in safety, it is necessary to review the origin of safety incidents recorded during MMRT 
interventions. As explained in the following sections, tangible benefits in safety outcomes 
are related to planning work 
2.2.2.1 The Role of MMRT’s in Process Safety 
In the process industry, lessons learned from unprecedented disasters such as 
Seveso (1976), Bhopal (1984), or Texas City (2005) have urged the strengthening of safety 
by exploring all potential sources of undesired hydrocarbon releases. Beyond process 
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safety, research has expanded to include the concept of management and individual 
responsibility (Crowl & Louvar, 2001). As observed in Table 2.1, “Management” 
represents the third level of release mitigation measures (following “Inherent Safety” and 
“Engineering Design”). It stands as the first knowledge area that is not exclusively a 
“Process Engineering” domain (Prugh & Johnson, 1988). Nevertheless, the relevance of 
“Management” resides in the fact that reasonably related disciplines (e.g., project and 
program planning, reliability, maintenance, and management of change) arise as potential 
contributors for addressing the release problem. Consequently, improvements in 
maintenance programs could combine cross-discipline concepts to enhance safety. 
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Table 2. 1 Release Mitigation Measures (adapted from AICHE (Prugh & Johnson, 1988)). 
Hydrocarbon Release Mitigation Approaches 






Plant Physical Integrity 
Process Integrity 
Process Design Features for Emergency Control 
Spill Containment 
Management 
Operating Policies & Procedures 
Training for Vapor Release Prevention & Control 
Audits & Inspections 
Equipment Testing 
Maintenance Program 
Management of Changes 
Security 
Early Vapor Detection & Warning 
Detection by Sensors 
Detection by Personnel 
Countermeasures 
Water Sprays 
Water, Steam & Air Curtains 
Deliberate Ignition of Explosive Cloud 
Dilution 
Emergency Response 
Emergency Shutdown Equip & Procedures 
Site Evacuations 
Safe Havens 
Personal Protective Equipment  
Medical Treatment 
 
2.2.2.2 Safety Incidents during MMRT’s 
Despite the benefits of their implementation, MMRT interventions can also result 
in incidents or accidents (Lind, 2008; Okoh & Haugen, 2013). In the process industry, these 
activities have significantly contributed to the number of hydrocarbon leaks (NOPSA, 
2008) (Hale, Heming, Smit, Rodenburg, & van Leeuwen, 1998; HSE, 1987). (Koehorst, 
1989). More recently, nearly 60% of hydrocarbon leaks occurred during maintenance 
activities as observed on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) (J. E. Vinnem & Røed, 
24 
 
2015), (Roed, Vinnem, & Nistov, 2012). Consequently, MMRT interventions that solely 
improve safety (by increasing the infrastructure's reliability) are highly desirable. 
Achieving this condition depends on management involvement with execution efficiency, 
for which planning offers a capable alternative. 
2.2.2.3 Planning in MMRT’s and the Improvement on Safety Outcomes 
Proper planning of MMRT interventions can strengthen execution safety. A review 
of the categorized causes for accidents during maintenance interventions reveals poor 
planning is present in most incidents. As observed in Table 2.2, the most significant 
proportion of deficiencies involves resource management (hardware, personnel, facilities, 
documentation, and methods) and scheduling/work planning. As noted, the study on the 
causal factors of accidents places planning as possible means of improving safety.  
 














Resource Management 28 27 26 
Plan/Program 18 35 24 
Execution 30 20 23 
Design 11 10 10 
External (1) 7 5 15 
Unknown 6 3 2 
Where: 
N= Source of data with number of accidents analyzed  
F=Number of factors categorized 
(1) These could arguably be seen as failures of planning or scheduling in the sense of anticipation of, 
or rapid reaction to such external factors. 
 
As observed, pseudo projects like MMRT interventions represent a feasible 
alternative for analyzing some aspects of full-scale projects. However, the study of STS of 
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pseudo projects requires a multidisciplinary approach (Reason, 1997)  (Okoh & Haugen, 
2013). Quantitative models developed from STS hazards to represent variables, 
uncertainties, physical components, human factors, and governing organizations' influence 
are considered optimum for risk management purposes (Hubbard, 2009). Therefore, if cost 
and safety outcomes are to be evaluated, the STS has to be characterized by a single model 
containing (among all variables) both elements of interest. 
2.3 Topic 3: Characterization of Pseudo-Projects for Analysis of  Cost & Safety 
The search for safety has been progressively moving toward approaches that treat 
execution environments as socio-technical systems (STS). Such is the case of MMRT 
interventions that encompass people and machines. Understanding the effects of planning 
on safety during MMRT interventions requires exploring possible human errors or 
violations during interventions. (Reason, 1990), (Van der Schaaf, 1995), (Rasmussen, 
1997) (Reiman, 2011). On the other hand, assessing the effects of planning on cost 
outcomes is also possible; but it requires integrating the cost component in the STS for 
achieving meaningful results. The modeling of STS in which accidents or incidents occur 
requires a method capable of associating SIF's to human behavior and safety outcomes. 
Bayesian Believe Networks (BBN's) represent a versatile method to model an STS's 
complexity. 
2.3.1 Bayesian Reasoning 
For scientific reasoning purposes, the ability to infer causal relationships is critical 
(Pearl, 2009). As opposed to plain statistical associations, the knowledge of causal 
relationships provides a profound understanding of a system and a gateway for potential 
control over the system’s states (Gadewadikar et al., 2010). This capacity comes from the 
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ability to predict the consequences of future actions. Inferring cause–effect relationships 
comes with a level of difficulty because causal relations cannot be observed directly. 
Therefore, these relationships need to be inferred from observable hints. Additionally, to 
infer the structure of a network of multiple cause–effect relationships, it is necessary to 
understand how individual cause–effect relationships interact (Steyvers, Tenenbaum, 
Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003). 
2.3.2 Causal Networks 
Causal networks are representations of how humans reason with causes 
(Neapolitan, 2004). These are built with the variables whose probability distributions 
satisfy the Markov condition and the edges (direct cause-effect relationships). Then, they 
are connected with a direct acyclic graph. Nevertheless, causal networks encompass a more 
comprehensive range of network methods that include nodes and arrows. Bayesian 
networks are only a type of causal network. When the directed acyclic graph is causal in a 
Bayesian network, the network is called a causal network (or causal network model). 
2.3.3 Bayesian Methods 
Bayesian methods are tools for data analysis that allow estimation of parameters, 
predictions for missing data, forecasts of future data, provide a computational framework 
for model estimation, selection, and validation, among other benefits (Hoff, 2009). 
Bayesian methods encompass updating prior beliefs based on the information contained in 
new data. Thomas Bayes (1701 – 1761) developed the Bayes theorem that allows the 
aggregation of probability and uncertainty from all types of information: generic, 
observations, human judgment, and both hard and soft data. The theorem calculates the 
probability of event effects based on the likelihood of their causes. These results support 
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diagnostic, inter-causal, and predictive reasoning in a broad range of applications of 
engineering, science, medicine, and others. Bayes theorem derives from the fundamental 






Given two events A and B, the conditional probability of event A given event B is 
defined as the ratio of the probability of the joint events A and B to the probability of B 
(for P(B) > 0). Then, Bayes theorem proposes reusing Axiom No.4 on the numerator: 
𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴⋂𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) ∗ 𝑃(𝐵) =  𝑃(𝐵⋂𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐴) 
As a result, in Equation (5), we obtain the posterior probability or belief about the 





     
Where P(B) ≠ 0 is the denominator or marginal distribution of B (evidence summed 
over all uncertain 𝐴 ) and is the normalization factor of the Bayes expression to result in 
the posterior probability density function. The total probability of B is also the prior 
predictive probability of the observed variable B, which is predicted based on prior P(A) 
information. Therefore, by the Law of Total Probability (LTP), we have:    
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 𝑃(𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴 ) ∗ 𝑃(𝐴 ) (7) 
 
2.3.4 Bayesian Networks 
A Bayesian network or Bayesian Believe Network (BBN) is a directed acyclic 
graph (DAG) in which nodes represent variables and arcs represent direct cause or 
influence between linked nodes. Conditional probabilities quantify the strength of these 
links. Each node (or variable) in a BBN has a finite set of mutually exclusive states. These 
dependency graphs represent the fundamental structure of human judgmental knowledge 
(Pearl, 1985). 
Bayesian Believe Networks can be classified based on the structure. "Singly 
Connected" BBN's contain at most one path between any two nodes, whereas "Multiply 
Connected" contains more than one path. Another way to classify BBN's is based on the 
type of random variables in the model, which can be "Discrete", "Continuous" or "Hybrid". 
Finally, they can be classified based on the change over time. In "Static" BBN's the nodes 
do not change their values over time, while the "Dynamic" BBN's can undoubtedly do (Ibe, 
2011).  The two main uses of BBN's are probabilistic inference and probabilistic learning 
of structures (topology) or parameters of a network (conditional probabilities). 
The probabilistic reasoning in Bayesian Networks begins with a hypothesis 𝐻, for 
which there exists some information or prior belief, so 𝑃(𝐻) is the Prior Probability of 𝐻 
(point value, range o distribution). Then, it is possible to revise the prior belief 𝑃(𝐻) based 
on the probability of the observed evidence 𝐸 given the hypothesis 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻) followed by 
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the normalization or total probability of the observed evidence 𝑃(𝐸). Now, if 𝑃(𝐻) and 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻) represent a rational person’s beliefs, then mathematically Bayes’ rule turns out to 
be an optimal method of updating a prior belief about 𝐻 given  new information 𝐸 (Cox, 
1946, 1963) (Savage, 1972).  
Bayesian methods have encountered some criticism focused on the difficulty of 
formulating prior beliefs (precisely and mathematically). Nevertheless, even with non-
exact priors, these methods provide good approximations to what the posterior belief 
should be and allow inference in complex statistical problems with no obvious non-
Bayesian methods  (Hoff, 2009). 
As an illustration of Bayesian networks, consider the three events A, B, and C, in 
serial connection as shown in Figure 2.3: 
 
Notice event B is conditionally dependent on event A, and event C is conditionally 
dependent on event B. If events A and C are said to be conditionally independent, then; it 
can also be said event A directly affects event B. Also, event A indirectly affects event C  
(through event B). Now, if Bayes’ Theorem is applied to the network: 










If the prior probability of C is known, and then B is observed, the revised likelihood 








𝑃(𝐶|𝐴⋂𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐶|𝐵) 
If the objective is to obtain the probability of the network or probability of A, B, 
and C, the Law of Total Probability (LTP) produces: 






 𝑃(𝐴)      
As another illustration of Bayesian networks, consider the three events D, E, and F, 
in converging connection as shown in Figure 2.4: 
 
Figure 2. 4 Bayesian Network for events D, E and F 
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𝑃(𝐷, 𝐸, 𝐹) = 𝑃(𝐹|𝐷⋂𝐸)𝑃(𝐷)𝑃(𝐸) =  𝑃(𝐹|𝐸) 𝑃(𝐹|𝐷)𝑃(𝐷)𝑃(𝐸)    






 𝑃(𝐷)𝑃(𝐸)    
In the development of Bayesian networks, it is essential to understand the 
conditional independence regarding the propagation of probabilities (Jensen, 2001). 
Therefore, consider a diverging connection as shown in Figure 2.5. If the state of H is 
known, then no knowledge on I will alter the probability of G: 
 








    
𝑃(𝐼|𝐺, 𝐻) =  𝑃(𝐼|𝐻)     
For a general definition of a BBN, consider n random variables X1, X2, X3 …, Xn, a 
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) with n nodes and assume node j in the graph is associated 
with the Xj variable. Then, the graph is a BBN if the following condition is met: 
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 𝑃(𝑋 , 𝑋 , 𝑋 , . . . , 𝑋 ) = 𝑃 𝑋 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑋 )     (8) 
In equation (8),  𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑋 ) denotes the set of variables Xi  such that there is an 
arc from node i to j in the graph (Pourret, Naïm, & Marcot, 2008). Therefore, the joint 
probability of the network is the product of each variable's probabilities, given the 
parents' probability. When variable Xi does not have parents, its probability is:   
 𝑃 𝑋 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑋 ) = 𝑃(𝑋 )     
 
Moreover, any joint probability distribution may be represented by a BBN and it 
is expressed as follows (Pourret et al., 2008): 
 𝑃(𝑋 , 𝑋 , 𝑋 , . . . , 𝑋 ) =  𝑃(𝑋 ) 𝑃(𝑋 , 𝑋 , . . . , 𝑋 |𝑋 )  
 =  𝑃(𝑋 ) 𝑃(𝑋 |𝑋 )𝑃(𝑋 , . . . , 𝑋 |𝑋 , 𝑋 )  
 = . ..  
 𝑃(𝑋 , 𝑋 , 𝑋 , . . . , 𝑋 ) =  𝑃(𝑋 ) 𝑃(𝑋 |𝑋 ). . . 𝑃(𝑋 |𝑋 , . . . , 𝑋 ) (9) 
 
BBN's (as opposed to classical statistical tools alone) offer several benefits that 
include the explicit modeling of causal factors, the reasoning from effect to cause and 
vice-versa, and the ability to overturn previous beliefs in the light of new evidence.  Yet, 
the most significant benefit in the study of socio-technical systems resides in its ability to 
combine a diverse type of evidence, including both subjective beliefs and objective data 
(Fenton & Neil, 2012).  
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The modeling of socio-technical systems comes with a significant level of 
difficulty. It implies dealing with the system’s complexity and size as well as uncertainties 
in the parameter of estimation (Zio, 2009), integration of qualitative and quantitative 
knowledge on different levels of abstraction (Delmotte, 2003; Papazoglou et al., 2003), 
dependencies between events (Torres-Toledano & Sucar, 1998), the temporality of aspects 
(Labeau, Smidts, & Swaminathan, 2000), and the nature of multi-state components 
(Griffith, 2016). Classical methods such as Dynamic Fault Trees, Markov Chains, and Petri 
Nets have been used to address reliability problems. However, the modeling flexibility of 
BNs to address complex systems has been increasingly driving interest, especially when 
complemented with domain experts or subject matter experts (Langseth, 2008). 
As observed, a BBN can be built to represent the effect of planning in an STS that 
comprises cost and safety. A BBN can be updated based on new evidence (acquired from 
planning efforts) and propagate it throughout all connected nodes. With influencing factors 
identified and depicted in a cause-risk-effect mode, a BBN can characterize the STS of an 
MMRT intervention and include cost and safety outcomes of execution. 
2.4 Summary of Literature Review 
The above-discussed literature highlights the following concepts: 
I. The role of project planning in uncertainty reduction. The management of 
uncertainty (utilizing acquired information through planning) leverages the project 
outcomes of execution by acting on the influencing factors. 
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II. The influence of project planning on cost outcomes of execution. The influence of 
planning efforts on cost has been extensively studied. The cost influence over time 
shows the positive impact. 
III. The influence of project planning on safety outcomes of execution. As observed in 
cost, safety might be able to be improved with planning efforts. However, the 
benefit is not evident and requires an innovative view of the relationship planning-
safety. 
IV. The similarities of pseudo projects (such as MMRT interventions) to full-size 
projects allow the analysis of cost. In the absence of project data, alternative 
methods require an estimation of the plan's appropriateness and the expected value 
of planning efforts before execution. 
V. The similarities of pseudo projects (such as MMRT interventions) to full-size 
projects allow the analysis of safety. Pseudo projects face numerous safety 
incidents for which inadequate planning has previously been determined as the 
highest contributor. 
VI. The adequacy of BBN's for modeling STS of execution of pseudo projects. Causal 
methods such as Bayesian Believe Networks allow the representation of cost and 








CHAPTER III : METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
Despite the generally acknowledged importance of planning to develop a strategy 
and accomplish a goal, no literature directly quantifies its value in project settings. Then, 
any practical proposition of planning work as means of improving safety and cost outcomes 
of execution requires a coherent method to manage uncertainty and some form of 
quantification of the claimed benefits.  
3.1.1 Levels in Management of Uncertainty 
In project settings, uncertainty is managed in several ways based on organizational, 
managerial, or personal attitude toward risk. A simplified way to categorize these 
approaches is by inclusion (or not) of uncertainty. This classification identifies two major 
levels in the management of uncertainty: a traditional deterministic treatment (Level 1) and 
a probabilistic (Level 2). A progressive refinement in the characterization of the socio-
technical system (where execution takes place) through a causal model can be considered 
an enhanced Level 2 or a Level 3. 
3.1.1.1 Level 1: Deterministic 
The level relies on single-point estimates of the cost to complete (a work package) 
and the assumption the system is safe to intervene 𝑃(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 0. The execution team 
has an uncertainty-free idea of the system state and cost estimate for the work scope. 
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3.1.1.2 Level 2: Traditional Probabilistic 
The level accounts for uncertainty with the limitations of traditional cost and 
schedule risk analysis tools available (e.g., risk register and EMV) before an intervention. 
It represents the first attempt to introduce uncertainty in assessing cost and safety (chances 
for injuries, damage, or loss) by means of hazard analysis tools that can (with some 
limitations) be applied to any intervention. This level represents a significant improvement 
from the deterministic perspective, however; there is no consideration of the 
interrelationships among all cost and safety risk factors as these are assumed independent 
from each other.  
3.1.1.3 Level 3: Causal 
The level builds on level 2 and originates from the execution team’s decision to 
acquire additional information about the system state. Level 3 analysis also allows for 
assessing social and technical factors that influence the likelihood of accidents taking into 
consideration their interdependencies. With level 3, additional planning can be evaluated 
for optimum levels based on the expected value of information (cost) and a refined 
estimation of the probability of accidents (safety). 
As observed in Figure 3.1, pursuing additional information or conducting further 
planning (before execution) brings three significant benefits to uncertainty management:  
1. It allows for the estimation of Value of Information (project cost)  
2. It allows for an enhanced risk register, hazard analysis, and identification of the 
influencing factors (project safety) 





It shall be noticed Level 2 implies reduction methods (such as in fault trees) to avoid 
over counting failure modes that would produce inaccurate top event probability 
calculations. The exercise becomes unfeasible in the presence of multiple failure modes 
and consequences, limiting even further its applicability in project settings. On the other 
hand, Level 3 brings the need to identify factors that influence the likelihood of accidents 
during interventions. These factors are diverse and may originate from multiple sources 
such as the job site's physical condition, human error and are offset by safety measures or 
barriers in place. A causal model represented by a BBN can provide the tool to treat a 
project execution as a socio-technical system (STS).  
Figure 3. 1 The Management of Uncertainty on Cost and Safety during Execution 
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3.2 Research Method 
The methodology aims to explore and incorporate socio-technical aspects of 
MMRT interventions in process plants. For the method to be applicable, it must be generic 
and adjustable to other industries (such as construction) and local/specific conditions. 
Relevant SIF’s need to be identified, the interaction among these factors modeled, and 
additional planning efforts characterized. Once a meaningful representation of the referred 
STS is achieved, scenarios corresponding to different levels of planning efforts are tested. 
In the end, safety and cost outcomes of execution are observed. 
3.2.1 Exploratory Analysis 
In the exploratory analysis, existing models of socio-technical systems that account 
for incidents or accidents applicable to MMRT interventions are considered. The objective 
of this exercise is the identification of factors and the direction of causality. As opposed to 
traditional simulation methods, this exploratory analysis does not aim to predict the 
behavior of a system or optimize the system.  
3.2.2 Modeling of the Socio-Technical System 
Because of their relevance with the safety outcomes, three viewpoints are explored. 
These propositions regarding the factors that influence accidents and incidents are 
considered in building this study's model.  
a) Abstraction from the Reason’s Model: The human contribution to the breakdown 




b) Anatomy of Accidents & Incidents: Dangerous situations that become incidents or 
accidents have three sources: Technical Factors, Human Factors, and 
Organizational Factors (Van der Schaaf, 1995).  
c) Abstraction from Rasmussen’s Model: All control levels exercised by the 
stakeholders (from government down to supervisory staff and workers) influence 
the execution outcomes and shall be taken into account (Rasmussen, 1997). 
Additionally, the model requires consideration of problems encountered during the 
actual maintenance work execution. When an intervention is not properly performed due 
to human error, it can be attributed to Fatigue, Stress, Complacency, Lack of Assertiveness, 
Knowledge, Awareness or Communication, Distraction, Unsafe Norms, Lack of Resources 
or Teamwork (Reiman, 2011) . Other causes of human error during interventions include 
inadequate training, deficient skill level, faulty procedures, insufficient supervision, lack 
of motivation, unacceptable stress levels, and poor working conditions (Ebeling, 2004).   
3.2.3 Development of the Causal Model implemented with a BBN 
The three criteria selected for the STS modeling are combined in a BBN. The 
network incorporates human and organizational factors to assess their influence on an 
intervention's safety outcomes quantitatively. The literature review shows incidents and 
accidents during MMRT interventions happen due to two types of failures: 1. Infrastructure 
(Latent Failure) and 2. Human error (Active Failure).  
 Based on a simplified accident causation model, it can be observed there are three 
main groups or categories of SIF’s (technical, human, and organizational). Each category 
poses dangerous situations to the STS. Every situation becomes an incident when adequate 
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defenses are not in place, and then it becomes an accident when the system cannot recover 
from the incident.  
When searching for types or groups of SIF’s, Rasmussen’s model for control levels 
recognizes a broader group of stakeholders (from government down to supervisory staff 
and workers) that influence the outcomes of interventions within industrial environments. 
Therefore, organizational and non-organizational or external factors will affect the system 
and need to be accounted for in the model. Since the objective is to obtain the likelihood 
of incidents/accidents resulting from an intervention, it is necessary to incorporate all three 
categories in the model. The technical, human, and organizational categories are related to 
both types of failures (active and latent). 
3.2.4 Development of Node Probability Tables (NPT’s):  
Once the variables or nodes within BBN are identified, the next step is to define the 
probability of each node or factor given every possible state of the parent nodes. The 
selected method is a weights system based on parent nodes' relative importance. With a 
Delphi technique, the weights are estimated by four doctoral students from three 
engineering departments: chemical, mechanical, and civil. The exercise is based on the 
agreement on the relative importance of parent nodes as influencers to each node under 
analysis. 
3.2.5 Development of the Method to Measure the Effect of Additional Planning 
The purpose of the measuring method is to quantify the amount (intensity) of 
planning necessary to improve safety.  Taking into consideration the replicability  real 
projects, the selected method was the “Level of Effort” or “Number of Planning Efforts out 
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of a Total (Available)”. Methods such as PDRI (Project Development Rate Index) 
developed by the Construction Industry Institute (CII) and Information Entropy (S) were 
discarded. The Level of Effort concept consists of incremental tests performed on the SIF’s 
within the BBN. On the other hand, the tests may not always be effective, therefore; only 
effective tests were captured and reported. 
3.2.6 Plot of Intensity of Planning against Cost and Safety Outcomes of 
Execution 
A continuous improvement in safety outcomes of execution (reducing the 
probability of accidents) is expected from increased planning efforts. As to cost outcomes 
of execution, it is expected to observe a region where continuous planning efforts no longer 




Cost Outcomes of Execution 
Safety Outcomes of Execution 
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CHAPTER IV : MODEL FORMULATION 
 
The proposed model characterizes the cost and safety relationship of an MMRT 
intervention as a 3-layered module (Cost, Causal Network and Safety). The Project Cost 
Layer (PC-L) is represented by a Decision Tree (DT), and a Fault Tree represents the 
Project Safety Layer (PS-L). There is a third one that comprises the socio-technical system 
of intervention in between both layers.  The Intermediate Layer (Int-L) is characterized by 
a causal network where safety influencing factors (SIF's) can be revealed and studied.  
A single node within the Int-L may represent an accident's occurrence and be 
directly influenced by one or more nodes of the causal network. Then, the node can be 
viewed as a Fault Tree (FT) driven by events that affect an accident's likelihood (i.e., 
Unsafe Acts and Latent Conditions). In the proposed model, a node in the Int-L named 




Nevertheless, the simplification as mentioned above poses a modeling problem. 
Many nodes may be deemed to influence the so-called “Accident” node. In such a case, the 
combined effect of multiple direct factors on a single node could be challenging to 
interpret. Therefore, only those factors directly affecting node “Accident” are logically tied 
with an arc on the Int-L of the proposed model. The rest of SIF’s are considered indirect, 
and their influence is reflected in the model through the propagation of probabilities in the 
causal network.  
 
Figure 4. 1  Decomposition of an Intervention (MMRT) into Layers 
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4.1 The Project Cost Layer (PC-L) or Risk-Based Cost Outcome 
The need to account for the cost implications of the decision to pursue additional 
information leads to a DT's development to estimate the VOI or value of additional 
planning. In the execution of regular projects, perhaps the most frequent decision relates to 
whether additional planning is worth pursuing to reduce the project manager's uncertainty. 
These decisions affect the workers' safety, project duration, and final cost. Therefore, in 
regular projects and in MMRT interventions conducting a test or performing additional 
planning becomes an alternative that can be represented in a DT.  
The pre-posterior analysis allows evaluating the pursuit of additional information. It is 
done by comparing the benefits of lowering the uncertainty against the expenditure of 
resources (time, labor, or cost) typically constrained in project environments. Alternatives, 
outcomes, and corresponding utilities (Figure 4.2) represent the components of the decision 




Figure 4. 2 Decision Tree for the estimation of VOI 
 
Where: 
ai = The ith Resource Utilization alternative that belongs to 
alternative set A, 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 = {1,2}  
 
ɵj = The jth outcome of the Quality of Plan (expressed by the 
proximity of WAI to WAD) that belongs to outcome set Ɵ, ɵ ∈




ok = The kth outcome of the Planning Ability to Reveal an 
Influencing Factor that belongs to outcome set O, o ∈ 𝑂 =
{1,2} 
 
tm = The mth Planning alternative that belongs to alternative set M, 
𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 = {1}  
 
zl = The lth outcome of the Planning Alternative (effectiveness to 
produce confirming results) that belongs to outcome set L,     
𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 = {1,2,3} 
 
U(No-test, ai, ɵj) = Utility of outcome ɵj from the resource utilization alternative ai 
under the “No-test” strategy  
 
U(Test, zl, ai, ok ,ɵj) = Utility of outcome ɵj resulting from outcome ok of the resource 
utilization alternative ai that originates from test outcome 
zl under the “Test” strategy 
 
P(ɵj| No-test, ai) = Probability of outcome ɵj given resource utilization alternative 
ai under the “No-test” strategy 
 
P(ɵj| Test, zl, ai, ok) = Probability of outcome ɵj given outcome ok of the resource 
utilization alternative ai that originates from test outcome 
zl under the “Test” strategy  
 
P(ok| Test, zl, ai) = Probability of outcome ok given the resource utilization 
alternative ai that originates from test outcome zl under the 
“Test” strategy.  
 
In the proposed model, the calculation of the EMV is performed on both major 
alternatives under analysis: a) “No Test” or “No Further Planning” meaning the work will 
be executed with current knowledge of surrounding conditions and b) “Test” or “Further 




a. “No Test” or “No Further Planning” Alternative: 
From equation (1): 
𝐸[𝑎 ] = 𝑃(Ɵ ׀ 𝑁𝑜 − 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑎 ). 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 − 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑎 ) 
The optimal decision is obtained with equation (2):  
𝑑[𝑎 ] = max 𝑃(Ɵ ׀ 𝑁𝑜 − 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑎 ). 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 − 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑎 )  
Therefore, the expected monetary value from the “No Further Planning” 
alternative is given by: 
 𝐸⌈𝑁𝑜 − 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡⌉ = 𝐸(𝑎∗) = 𝑑⌈𝑎 ⌉ (8) 
 
b. “Test” or “Further Planning” Alternative: 
From equation (1): 
𝐸[𝑂 ] = 𝑃(Ɵ | 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑧 ,𝑎 , 𝑜 ,Ɵ ). 𝑈(𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑧 ,𝑎 , 𝑜 ,Ɵ ) 
The optimal decision is obtained with equation (2): 
𝑑[𝑂 ] = max 𝑃(Ɵ | 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑎 ). 𝑈(𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑎 )  
From equation (1): 
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E[a ] = P(o  | Test, z , a ). o  
The optimal decision is obtained with equation (2): 
𝑑[𝑎 ] = max 𝑃(O | 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑍 , 𝑎 ). O  
Therefore, the expected monetary value from the “Test” or “Further Planning” 
alternative is given by: 
 𝐸[𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡] = 𝐸(𝑡 ) = 𝑃(Z | 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡). a  (10) 
Finally,  with equation (3) it can be estimated the Value of Information (VOI): 
 𝑉𝑂𝐼 =  𝐸(𝑡𝑘) − 𝐸(𝑎∗) (11) 
 
4.1.1 Project Cost Layer Alternatives (ai) 
The first decision to be made before execution  (Test/No Test) is to proceed 
immediately or wait until more information is gathered. The comparison of the expected 
monetary value of the “Test” alternative (including associated planning costs) against the 
“No Test” will produce the Value of information (VOI). The next decision refers to 
resource utilization. Before executing an activity or task, the lead (project manager, 
foreman, or maintenance crew lead) has a pre-conceived idea of the system state or safety 
level. Being 100% certain about the actual state is unlikely; therefore, two evident 




(1) Proceed with Minimal Resources, or typical preparation (planning)  
(2) Proceed with Excessive Resources under the assumption workers might face 
abnormal or adverse conditions during execution; therefore, extra resources 
(tools, parts & material) are allocated as contingency measures. 
 
4.1.2 Project Cost Layer Outcomes (Ɵj , Ok) 
Additional planning can confirm whether the execution will match the plan. The 
Ɵj outcomes can be:  
(1)  Confirming Results:  
- Planning efforts are effective and improve prior knowledge,  
(2)  Inconclusive Results:  
- Planning efforts do not reduce the uncertainty about the outcome   
(3)  Non-confirming Results:  
- Planning efforts increase the manager’s uncertainty.  
On the other hand, given a resource utilization strategy under further planning, the Ok 
outcomes include (1) The Safety Influencing Factor (SIF) is Revealed and (2) The 
Influencing Factor (SIF) is Not Revealed.  
 
4.1.2.1 WAI and WAD  
In the proposed model, WAI=WAD is the outcome or condition where the work's 
execution is a perfect reflection of the plan. In other words, all assumptions about how the 
work should be performed match (flawlessly) how the work is performed in the field. 
WAI≠WAD is the outcome where the execution does not follow the plan, and assumptions 
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about how the work should be performed differ from how the work is performed. The 
proximity of WAI to WAD (expressed as a probability) is a fundamental component of the 
DT and is found in both main alternatives:  No-Test = P(ɵj| No-test, ai) and Test = P(ɵj| 
Test, zl, ai, ok).  
4.1.3 Project Cost Layer Utilities 
In estimating the value of planning (or Value of Information), every alternative-
outcome combination needs to encompass a monetary utility. Base utilities U(No-test, ai, 
ɵj) of the “No-test” or “No further planning” alternative result from the proximity of WAI 
to WAD and the corresponding resource utilization strategy. Revised utilities U(Test, zl, 
ai, ok, ɵj) of the “Test” or “Further planning” option result from the combination of the 
matching of WAI to WAD, resource utilization, and effectiveness of planning. Revised 
utilities account for the cost of planning applied on top of the base utilities. 
4.2 The Intermediate Layer (Int-L) 
The decision to pursue the “Further planning” alternative (as represented in the 
project cost layer) acknowledges the existence of factors influencing the outcomes of 
execution (e.g., the use of resources, the actual duration of activities, incidents, or 
accidents). If the outcomes of interest are related to safety; then, inductive reasoning is 
required to identify the precursors (e.g., mistakes and violations) and corresponding 
originators (e.g., excessive workload and inappropriate work methods).  
The development of the Int-L involved the identification and coupling of SIF's. 
From the propositions discussed in an exploratory analysis, potential sources of accidents 
in MMRT interventions were examined. The exercise produced a list of factors that could 
potentially affect the safety outcomes. Some factors came from the organizational domain, 
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such as the adequacy of technical documentation before execution and the employees' 
workload. Other sources included the scope of work expressed in the task's type and 
complexity. Next, the analysis comprised identifying pairs of factors to assess the direction 
of causality and degree of association (evident or weak). The results of the first iteration 
can be observed in Figure 4.3. A bold arrow in the diagram represents an evident 
association, while a dotted implies a weak or indirect link. The latter case suggests further 
analysis is required to identify intermediate factors.   
 
Unsafe acts during execution (e.g., violations and mistakes) and latent conditions 
(such as inadequacy of safety conditions in the workplace) are the precursors to accidents. 
However, factors are affecting the presence of unsafe acts or latent conditions. These SIF’s 
Figure 4. 3  Preliminary Identification of Safety Influencing Factors (SIF’s) in the     
Intermediate Layer (Int-L) 
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(e.g., organizational characteristics, supervision, and complexity of the scope of work) are 
the best candidates for being investigated to positively affect the safety outcomes of 
execution expressed as Likelihood of Incidents or Accidents (LIA’s).  
The SIF’s or variables of interest identified for the Int-L can be modeled with a 
finite number of discrete states (e.g., Boolean, labeled, or ranked nodes) or an infinite 
number of states (Continuous nodes). Because of the factorial growth in the size of the 
NPT’s (driven by the number of states of each node), the Int-L contains labeled nodes with 
two discrete states each. As a result, the propagation of evidence can effortlessly be 
calculated.  For every pair of nodes, A (parent ) and B (child or consequence), each having 
binary states (True/False) and a defined causality, we have: 
 
If prior probabilities of the states in node A are :   







Then probabilities for B given A are: 
A FALSE TRUE 
B 
FALSE q 1-r 




By LTP in Equation (7), the probability of a child node (B) is defined as: 
𝑃(𝐵 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) 
= 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒|𝐴 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒)𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) + 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒|𝐴 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒)𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) 
= 𝑟(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑝 
Then, if evidence is found (by means of investigations or planning efforts) on any 
node we observe the changes in the probability or degree of belief of non-observed 
nodes: 
Case 1: Evidence about Node A: (𝑨 = 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒆)  ∴  [𝑷(𝑨 =  𝑭𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒆) =  𝟎] 
 
𝑃(𝐵 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) = 𝑃(𝐵 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒|𝐴 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒)𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) + 0 






Case 2: Evidence about Node B: (𝑩 = 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒆)  
 











𝑟(1 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑝
 
4.2.1 From Conceptual Cause-Effect Model to BBN 
Bayesian Believe Networks (BBN’s) are unambiguous descriptions of 
dependencies between variables. The STS of an MMRT intervention is modeled as a BBN 
to propagate probabilities from identified factors (parent nodes) down to the children 
(ultimate outcomes). Starting from the theoretical knowledge described in this study's 
background section, the BBN is built from the simplest cause-effect representation of 
events to the complete identification of relevant nodes. In the BBN, risks are characterized 
by a causal chain of events. The representation involves the event itself, one or more 
consequences, the trigger or initiating event, and the control or impediment events that may 
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stop the trigger from causing the risk event. Finally, one or more mitigating events that can 
help avoid the consequence of the risk are included (See Figure 4.4)  
 
When the causal view of risk is applied to the preliminary group of identified 
SIF’s of the Int-L (Figure 4.3), a series of branches and components of the final BBN starts 
to take shape (see Figure 4.5). Two examples are illustrated: a) the risk of a violation 
committed during execution and b) the risk of a mistake made during execution.  




4.2.3 A Numerical Example of Propagation of Probabilities throughout the BBN  
The illustration below helps visualize the propagation of probabilities in a section 
of the BBN in the Int-L that involves four linked nodes. Notice in the model, it is assumed 
all nodes contain binary states (Yes/No). Furthermore, if we know (by any available means) 
“Excessive Workload” (O) has a prior probability 𝑃 = 0.4 and “Inadequate Technical 
Documentation” (T) has 𝑃 = 0.1, then;  the observable variable “Violation during 
Execution” (M) has two direct causes or parent nodes (O and T). (See Figure 4.6):  
a) Violation             b)   Mistake 




As seen in Table 4.1, the Node Probability Table (NPT) for node child node (M) 
contains 2  values (2 states per node and 3 nodes), and it is conditioned on states of both 
parent nodes (O) and (T). 
 
Table 4. 1 Conditional Probability Table for node “Violation during Execution” 
Excessive Workload (O) N Y 
Inadequate Tech Documentation (T) N Y N Y 
Violation during Execution (M) 
N 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Y 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.8 
 
Now, with LTP marginalization over O and T the total probability of a 
“Violation during Execution” 𝑃(𝑀) = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 is calculated as follows: 
𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) =  𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂, 𝑇) 
,
𝑃(𝑂) 𝑃(𝑇) 
=  𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂 =  𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠)𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 
+ 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂 =  𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜)𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜) 
+ 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂 =  𝑁𝑜, 𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠)𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 
Figure 4. 6   Section of the BBN affecting node “Violation during Execution” (M) 
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+ 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂 =  𝑁𝑜, 𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜)𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑁𝑜, 𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜) 
=  0.8 ∗ 0.4 ∗ 0.1 + 0.6 ∗ 0.4 ∗ 0.9 + 0.6 ∗ 0.6 ∗ 0.1 + 0.3 ∗ 0.6 ∗ 0.9 
=  0.446 
Also, we know the variable “Mistake during Execution” (N) only depends on 
“Inadequate Documentation” (T) and the corresponding CPT is shown in Table 4.2: 
 
Table 4. 2 Conditional Probability Table for node “Mistake during Execution” 
Inadequate Tech Documentation (T) N Y 
Mistake during Execution (N) 
N 0.9 0.2 
Y 0.1 0.8 
 
Then, the prior probability 𝑃(𝑁) = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 is calculated with LTP: 
𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 |𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠)𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 
+𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑇 =  𝑁𝑜)𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜) 
= 0.8 ∗ 0.1 + 0.1 ∗ 0.9 
= 0.17 
Finally, when an observation is made (i.e., an investigation or a planning effort) 
on any variable, the evidence updates the entire network's probabilities. For example, if an 
observation is made on the node (N) and it is confirmed a mistake occurred during 
execution, the updated probabilities on (T) and (M) are produced. 
 Given a mistake occurred (𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) the probability of (T) updates (from 0.1 to 
0.471): 







𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑁 =  𝑌𝑒𝑠) =








Per probability axiom No.2:  
𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜 | 𝑁 =  𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 1 −  0.471 =  0.529 
 Given a mistake occurred (𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) the probability of (M) updates from (0.446 to 
0.542): 
𝑃(𝑀 =  𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) =  𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂, 𝑇) 
,
𝑃(𝑂) 𝑃(𝑇 |𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 ) 
=  𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂 =  𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 
+ 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂 =  𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜) 𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜 | 𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 
+ 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂 =  𝑁𝑜, 𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑁𝑜) 𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 
+ 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠 | 𝑂 =  𝑁𝑜, 𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜) 𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑁𝑜) 𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑁𝑜 | 𝑁 = 𝑌𝑒𝑠) 
=  0.8 ∗ 0.4 ∗ 0.471 + 0.6 ∗ 0.4 ∗ 0.523 + 0.6 ∗ 0.6 ∗ 0.471 + 0.3 ∗ 0.6 ∗ 0.529 
= 0.542 
The numerical example shows evidence (through instantiation) can be input to 
any node in the BBN from where it will be propagated throughout the network. It allows 
updating the probabilities of the unobserved nodes. In the model, upon the complete 
identification of all SIF’s the BBN nodes are created, expert opinion is consolidated on the 
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direction of causality to determine what evidence will update each BBN node, and Node 
Probability Tables (NPT) are developed. As the last step, the evidence is progressively 
inputted to the SIF’s, and the updated probability values of the nodes “Accident” and 
“Quality of Execution Plan” are systematically captured. 
4.3 The Project Safety Layer (PS-L) 
The safety outcome of an intervention (or LIA) is directly affected by two factors 
or causes: 1) Unsafe Acts and 2) Latent Conditions. A workplace incident or accident may 
occur if an unsafe act (such as choosing an improper tool) or latent condition (such as 
operating a defective tool) triggers an event. The failure of the defenses in place can be 
studied with Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), in which the undesired outcome (incident or 
accident) is connected to both influencing factors with an “OR Gate”. However, as seen in 
Figure 4.7, the three components may also be represented as corresponding nodes in a 
causal network.   
The third layer of the proposed model is intended to identify the safety outcomes 
of execution.  Although part of the Int-L, the occurrence of an incident or accident resulting 
from an intervention requires isolation from the network. Because of the significance of 
the safety outcomes expressed as the Likelihood of Incidents or Accident (LIA), the node 





4.4 Planning as the Linkage of Cost (PC-L) and Safety (PS-L)  
The association between the PC-L and the PS-L layers is not intuitive and requires 
further analysis. As observed in the Intermediate Layer (Int-L), the relationship between a 
SIF and LIA during an intervention is evident.  The link and direction of causality between 
these two elements are identifiable. On the other hand, the relationship between the Quality 
of the Execution Plan (QEP) and the VOI can be established through a transitional element 
(the matching of WAI to WAD).  
Figure 4. 7 Conversion of a Fault Tree into Causal Network Nodes 
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Further knowledge about a SIF impacts the LIA thru the occurrence of human error; 
however, it is not evident that any gained knowledge (using planning efforts) also affects 
the quality of the plan (See Figure 4.8). Notice gained knowledge can:   
1) Adjust the likelihood of occurrence of the factor itself (e.g., an investigation 
about available technical documentation improves the likelihood of being adequate 
for execution). 
2) Confirm (or reject) the appropriateness or quality of the execution plan (e.g., an 
investigation about available technical documentation confirms the execution plan 
was insufficiently developed).  
Therefore, every time a planning effort results in improved knowledge about a SIF, 
both the LIA and VOI are simultaneously updated, establishing the relationship between 




Figure 4. 8 Final Model as Formulated 
 
As observed, the causal network in the proposed model (that extends through the 
Int-L and PS-L) incorporates known SIF’s, available control measures, interactions among 
factors, and mitigation measures to assess their influence on the ultimate safety outcomes 
(LIA’s). As observed, the model relies on planning efforts to gain knowledge (and update 
probabilities) about the SIF’s and propagate such probabilities down to the LIA’s in the 
PS-L. Finally, planning makes possible the propagation of probabilities back to the DT on 






CHAPTER V : CASE STUDY 
 
Due to the world’s growing demand for ammonia-based agricultural fertilizers, 
ammonia plants have continuously increased in number and capacity across the globe 
(Pattabathula & Richardson, 2016). Like many other process facilities, ammonia plants are 
constantly subject to interventions (maintenance, modifications, repairs, and tests). In this 
study, the maintenance of a process safety relief valve (PSV) within an ammonia plant was 
studied.  Figure 5.1 illustrates the schematic diagram of a PSV with some of its significant 
characteristics, and Figure 5.2  shows a typical location of a PSV within a process.  
 











This type of intervention is given as an example to explain better the method of 
analysis and how it can help quantify the benefits of planning. More specifically, the focus 
is given to the quantification of benefits in terms of the expected value of planning and 
likelihood of accidents.  
 
 
5.1 The Need for Maintenance on a Process Safety Valve (PSV) 
Frequently, PSV valves deteriorate due to highly corrosive environments or aging. 
Both factors have adverse effects on the setpoint and the relieving flow rate (Crowl & 
Louvar, 2001).  Like most engineering jobs or tasks in process plants, the maintenance of 
a PSV involves only a few resources (labor, tools, and materials).  Nevertheless, executing 
Figure 5. 2 Typical location of a PSV within a process 
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a relatively small task like this involves three plant management organizations: Maintenance, 
Engineering, and Production. 
The required maintenance work can be planned or unplanned based on the 
operator's maintenance policy. Planned maintenance (periodic, predictive, or preventive) 
involves monitoring the condition of equipment, inspections, service of equipment, and 
replacement, if necessary, at scheduled time intervals (Kister & Hawkins, 2006). On the 
other hand, Unplanned Maintenance involves testing, detection, localization, and 
diagnosis (Simeu-Abazi & Sassine, 2001). As observed, the execution, comprising the 
request, task initiation, priority assignment, planning, and performance of the PSV 
maintenance, are the final steps in a lengthy operational procedure. 
5.2 The Execution of Maintenance on a Process Safety Valve (PSV) 
An ordinary intervention such as PSV maintenance is streamlined within a process 
facility. At this point, the maintenance organization, which has the goal to maximize 
production, has already conducted required inspections, developed equipment performance 
reports, and determined the need to replace the valve. All the required information is then 
available for execution and complementary to the job request. Since the work details are 
specified, a list of needed resources is elaborated, and the approval is pursued and obtained. 
With the task approved to proceed, the execution team places orders for all needed 
materials and necessary equipment. In the end, the work is scheduled and executed.  The 






5.3 Modeling of the Cost Layer (PC-L ) or Risk-Based Execution Cost 
Regardless of the level of sophistication in project controls, work methods, and 
procedures, every execution team (project or maintenance) acknowledges risk. A simple 
risk register captures known events that may interfere with a PSV maintenance's normal 
execution. Within the register, such events are given a likelihood of occurrence ( > 0 ) and 
impact on a specific category (i.e., cost, duration, safety, or quality). When used in 
combination with a heat map or risk matrix (to prioritize risk), the register quantifies the 
effect of risk events on budget line items and total cost. 
A  risk register was developed for the maintenance of a PSV within an ammonia 
plant (See Appendix A). The focus on the risk identification was cost and duration. Once 
risks were identified through a Delphi technique, a qualitative assessment was performed 
on their probabilities and impacts (from 1-Very Low to 5-Very High). Next, the 
quantitative values for impact were estimated as the expected value of a BETA distribution 
made by the lowest, most likely, and highest values of individual ranges. On the other hand, 
the quantitative values for probability were set as the midpoint of corresponding ranges. 
5.3.1 The Execution Budget 
From all cost items associated with the intervention, materials and equipment 
were excluded from the analysis due to its variability driven by specific characteristics 
(size, type, or material) of every valve. Hence, the labor hours and associated costs for 
maintenance per valve are the primary elements for the study and were extracted from an 
analysis of PSV lifecycle maintenance costs (Gross & Harris, 2008). As observed in Table 




Table 5. 1 Estimated Original and Adjusted Labor Costs for a PSV Maintenance 
 
5.3.2 Utilities resulting from the Resource Utilization Strategy 
Under the Minimal Resources Strategy (no-action as a response to risks making 
the work proceed with no further provisions), two outcomes are possible: WAI=WAD and 
WAI≠WAD. The WAI=WAD outcome represents the best-case scenario (no risks event 
occurs). Here, the execution is performed according to the plan, producing no economic 
gain or loss (Utility U1 = $0.00). The worst-case scenario (all eleven risk events occur) 
happens when WAI≠WAD and all potential impacts turn real, producing the maximum 
loss under this strategy  (Utility U2 = $ -4,580.77) (See Table 5.2). 
As an example, observe Risk No.2 that states: “Errors in the initiation of job request 
will delay in the start of work and affect the schedule with an impact level 2 (15% duration 
increase) and 72% probability”. When applied to the cost estimate, it can be observed Risk 




Original Execution Budget 
Execution Budget adjusted under  













1 Planning $        68.9 5.0 $     344.3 0.0% 5.0 $     344.3 
2 Engineering $        68.9 3.0 $     206.6 10.0% 3.3 $     227.2 
3 Work Control & Scheduling $        68.9 4.0 $     275.4 75.0% 7.0 $     482.0 
4 
Lockouts - write, review, approve, install 
& remove 
$        68.9 12.0 $     826.3 80.0% 21.6 $  1,487.4 
5 Meetings POW, POD $        68.9 3.0 $     206.6 80.0% 5.4 $     371.8 
6 
Maintenance Wrench-Time (Remove, 
transport, re-install, PMT) 
$        51.8 5.7 $     295.3 95.0% 11.1 $     575.8 
7 Valve shop time hours $        51.8 2.3 $     119.1 90.0% 4.4 $     226.4 
 Total Outage Time  35.0   57.8  
 Total Estimated Cost per 
outage/lockout/valve 
  $  2,273.6   $  3,714.9 
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Risk 12  
COST  
Qual - Impact         
2 3 3 4  
COST  
Quant - Impact         
16% 38% 38% 78%  
SCHEDULE  
Qual - Impact 
4 2 3 4 3 3 3 4      
SCHEDULE  
Quant - Impact 
65% 15% 32% 65% 32% 32% 32% 65%      
Qual  
Probability 
3 4 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 4  
Quant 
Probability 
32% 72% 32% 72% 16% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 16% 72%  























Risk 12 Total 
1 $     
70.9 
$     
37.0 
$     
34.5 
$     
160.4 
$     
17.6 
$     
34.5 
$     
34.5 
$     
70.9 
$     
17.8 
$     
41.8 
$     
21.3 
$     
193.3  
2 $     
42.5 
$     
22.2 
$     
20.7 
$      
96.2 
$     
10.6 
$     
20.7 
$     
20.7 
$     
42.5 
$     
10.7 
$     
25.1 
$     
12.8 
$     
116.0  
3 $     
56.7 
$     
29.6 
$     
27.6 
$     
128.3 
$     
14.1 
$     
27.6 
$     
27.6 
$     
56.7 
$     
14.2 
$     
33.4 
$     
17.1 
$     
154.6  
4 $   
170.1 
$     
88.8 
$     
82.9 
$     
384.9 
$     
42.3 
$     
82.9 
$     
82.9 
$   
170.1 
$     
42.7 
$   
100.3 
$     
51.2 
$     
463.9  
5 $     
42.5 
$     
22.2 
$     
20.7 
$      
96.2 
$     
10.6 
$     
20.7 
$     
20.7 
$     
42.5 
$     
10.7 
$     
25.1 
$     
12.8 
$     
116.0  
6 $     
60.8 
$     
31.7 
$     
29.6 
$     
137.5 
$     
15.1 
$     
29.6 
$     
29.6 
$     
60.8 
$     
15.3 
$     
35.8 
$     
18.3 
$     
165.8  
7 $     
24.5 
$     
12.8 
$     
11.9 
$      
55.5 
$      
6.1 
$     
11.9 
$     
11.9 
$     
24.5 
$      
6.2 
$     
14.5 
$      
7.4 
$      
66.9  
Total $   
468.0 
$   
244.4 




$   
116.4 
$   
228.0 
$   
228.0 
$   
468.0 
$   
117.6 
$   
276.0 




$    
4,850.8 
 
The “Excess Resources Strategy” implies a response to risks by reducing the 
likelihood of occurrence (such as reinforcing supervision), the impact (such as adding 
workhours to the budget), or both. Under this approach, the utility is quantified based on 
the applicable risks and reduced probabilities or impacts. The best-case scenario (no risks 
occur) is represented by the “WAI = WAD” outcome where execution is performed in 
alignment with the plan; however, recognizing the presence of risks, the budget is increased 
with excess resources or additional funds.  
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As observed in the adjusted execution budget (Table 5.3), increase factors are 
applied to the estimated labor hours to account for low-impact, high-likelihood events and 
cover a reasonable amount of uncertainty. Assuming the majority of adverse events may 
be faced in the field (as opposed to during engineering or planning time), more conservative 
increase factors are applied to these line items (e.g., wrench time, shop time, and lockout).  
The resulting difference between the original and the adjusted budgets ($2,273.82 
- S3,714.90) becomes a loss in utility (Utility U3 = $ -1,441.28). The worst-case (all eleven 
risk events occur) takes place when “WAI ≠ WAD”; however, due to the addition of 
resources, the likelihood and impacts are reduced (by one level on this study). Under this 
outcome, the maximum utility loss will be smaller than the Minimal Resources Strategy 
(Utility U4 = $ -2,306.94) as shown in Table 5.3. 
Notice with the inclusion of the “Additional Planning” alternative in the DT, it 
grows and branches out to include two supplementary outcomes: 1) “Effectiveness of 
Planning” depicting three potential outcomes of a planning effort (confirming, 
inconclusive and non-confirming results)  for which probabilities are estimated with the 
Law of Total Probability (LTP) and 2) “The Revealing of the SIF” depicting two potential 
outcomes of the planning alternative combined with a resource utilization strategy (SIF 
Revealed = Yes and SIF Revealed = No) for which probabilities are estimated with the 

































Qual - Impact 
                1 2 2 3  
COST  
Quant - Impact 
                7% 16% 16% 38%  
SCHEDULE  
Qual - Impact 
3 1 2 3 2 2 2 3          
SCHEDULE  
Quant - Impact 
32% 6% 15% 32% 15% 15% 15% 32%          
Qual  
Probability 
3 4 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 4  
Quant 
Probability 
32% 72% 32% 72% 16% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 16% 72%  
              

























1  $     
34.5  
 $     
15.6  
 $     
16.4  
 $      
78.1  
 $      
8.3  
 $     
16.4  
 $     
16.4  
 $     
34.5  
 $      
7.6  
 $     
17.8  
 $      
9.1  
 $      
94.6   
2  $     
20.7  
 $      
9.4  
 $      
9.8  
 $      
46.9  
 $      
5.0  
 $      
9.8  
 $      
9.8  
 $     
20.7  
 $      
4.6  
 $     
10.7  
 $      
5.5  
 $      
56.8   
3  $     
27.6  
 $     
12.5  
 $     
13.1  
 $      
62.5  
 $      
6.7  
 $     
13.1  
 $     
13.1  
 $     
27.6  
 $      
6.1  
 $     
14.2  
 $      
7.3  
 $      
75.7   
4  $     
82.9  
 $     
37.5  
 $     
39.3  
 $     
187.5  
 $     
20.0  
 $     
39.3  
 $     
39.3  
 $     
82.9  
 $     
18.3  
 $     
42.7  
 $     
21.8  
 $     
227.0   
5  $     
20.7  
 $      
9.4  
 $      
9.8  
 $      
46.9  
 $      
5.0  
 $      
9.8  
 $      
9.8  
 $     
20.7  
 $      
4.6  
 $     
10.7  
 $      
5.5  
 $      
56.8   
6  $     
29.6  
 $     
13.4  
 $     
14.0  
 $      
67.0  
 $      
7.2  
 $     
14.0  
 $     
14.0  
 $     
29.6  
 $      
6.5  
 $     
15.3  
 $      
7.8  
 $      
81.1   
7  $     
11.9  
 $      
5.4  
 $      
5.7  
 $      
27.0  
 $      
2.9  
 $      
5.7  
 $      
5.7  
 $     
11.9  
 $      
2.6  
 $      
6.2  
 $      
3.1  
 $      
32.7   
Total  $   
228.0  
 $   
103.2  
 $   
108.0  
 $     
516.0  
 $     
55.1  
 $   
108.0  
 $   
108.0  
 $   
228.0  
 $     
50.4  
 $   
117.6  
 $     
60.0  
 $     
624.6  
 $    
2,306.9  
 
Finally, the alternative to pursue “Additional Planning” implies additional costs. 
Therefore, the revised utilities (from U5 to U28) result from base utilities (from U1 to U4) 
increased by the cost of the planning efforts.   
5.4 Modeling of the Intermediate Layer (Int-L) or Causal Network 
SIF’s of an intervention such as the maintenance of a PSV can be characterized in 
different ways. This study combines different sources of factors as identified in typical 
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maintenance work in process plants: organizational, the size and complexity of the scope 
of work, and the precursor conditions or acts that lead to incidents (See Figure 5.3) 
 
 
Figure 5. 3 Categorized Safety Influencing Factors (SIF’s) of a PSV Maintenance 
 
Organizational Factors represent the work methods, culture, and safety 
measures established by the governing organization. These factors are built in our model 
and adapted from the “Risk OMT Program” that studies barrier and operational risk 
analysis (J. Vinnem et al., 2012). These factors influence the likelihood of mistakes, 
violations or slips, and lapses during the PSV maintenance, which influences the likelihood 
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of accidents. The Scope of Work represents the amount of work (size) and complexity of 
a task. Because it is a source of uncertainty, it influences (indirectly) the likelihood of 
accidents. High-complexity tasks can limit the ability to identify all hazards associated with 
the execution. If these conditions are overlooked, the work permit will fail to capture, 
communicate, or control potential mistakes, violations, or slips during execution. The 
Incident/Accident Precursors are based on accident investigations of industrial 
maintenance activities (Reason, 1997), (Lind, 2008). Precursors (as sources of accidents) 
can be grouped into three categories: (1) Unsafe acts or human error as expressed in slips 
and lapses, mistakes and violations, (2) Workplace factors or facility design errors or 
conditions that may affect the safety of the worker during execution and (3) Organizational 
factors or management level guidelines for proper execution that (indirectly) influences the 
likelihood of accidents thru unsafe acts. 
Furthermore, BBN’s need to account for risk control and mitigation to properly 
depict the causal context.  As observed, for the model to produce relevant information, it 
is necessary to incorporate control measures that reduce the likelihood of accidents by 
influencing the workers’ performance. The proposed model includes the supervision of 
work and safety preventive measures (accounted for during the preparation of the work 
permit) as influencers on the control measures.  
5.5 Effect of Planning in WAI=WAD 
Interventions in process plants (and to some extent all regular projects) are 
characterized by constantly changing environments and therefore posing significant levels 
of uncertainty. Under these circumstances, further investigation of the conditions 
surrounding the execution is known as planning work. For example, further knowledge 
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regarding technical documentation, the complexity of the task to be performed, and current 
site conditions will affect the likelihood of an incident or accident during the intervention. 
Nevertheless, an improved level of understanding of a SIF would improve safety and 
determine whether the execution plan in hand (resources, time, safety measures, and work 
methods) is commensurate with the actual conditions in the field. In other words, it can 
gauge the quality of the plan (or P(WAI=WAD)) (See Figure 5.4).   
The investigation, testing, or planning activities to collect the latest conditions in 
the field measure the plan's appropriateness. In the case study context, typical examples of 
planning include verification of the need to depressurize a line, remove hazardous 
materials, and confirm escape routes. A perfect plan will "exhaustively" account for "all" 
latest conditions and imply the work-as-imagined (WAI) will equal the work-as-done 




Figure 5. 4 Effect of Planning on the Quality of Plan P(WAI=WAD) 
 
5.6 The Bayesian Believe Network (BBN) 
The STS of an intervention named "Replacement of a PSV" is represented in a 
causal model. SIF's (organizational, scope, and site conditions) primarily affect the 
likelihood of accidents. These factors are affected by the results of the planning efforts or 
testing. Although not always economically feasible, every factor can be studied or 
investigated before execution. Furthermore, every effort may not help reduce uncertainty 
about a factor. The effectiveness of planning efforts also has some degree of variability. 
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For example, the effectiveness of an investigation about the current status of a SIF will 
depend on whether the effort was exhaustive or not. Therefore, the further planning 
alternative displays three states. On the other hand, the uncertainty in a SIF is reshaped by 
the planning efforts' results. When it changes as a result of a planning effort, the new 
evidence propagates in the direction of the accident (center of the BBN) and the direction 
of the plan's quality or appropriateness (WAI=WAD). 
The final model of the STS consists of twenty (20) nodes or variables, each 
containing different states (see Appendix C).  Arcs or arrows characterizing causality were 
assigned considering what evidence will update which node. Finally, each node required 
the estimation of probabilities for combining their states and the ones from all influencing 
nodes. For example, the node probability table (NPT) for the node “Slips & Lapses” has 
two states, and each of its four parent nodes has two states, making 16 possible state 
combinations to consider (See Appendix D). A representation of the entire unconditioned 
model with nodes, states, and prior probabilities can be found in Appendix E, whereas the 









CHAPTER VI : ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Effect of Planning on Safety 
Safety and quality of plan were both tested against planning. Safety (expressed as 
the likelihood of accidents) and the quality of plan (expressed as the likelihood of 
WAI=WAD) were assessed against planning efforts. As described in the model 
formulation, planning efforts are measured as the number of investigative actions (or tests) 
performed before execution.  .   
The Socio-Technical System (STS) of the Process Safety Valve (PSV) maintenance 
was modeled as a Bayesian Believe Network (BBN). Except for supervision (considered a 
control measure), planning was performed on the 11 factors of the outer layer (Figure 5.6). 
When planning is effective, it reveals evidence about the state of a Safety Influencing 
Factor (SIF). Then, with Bayesian propagation, the evidence modifies the network. Next, 
observations are made on the node "Accident". As observed in Figure 6.1, the abscissa 




 The starting point (number of tests = 0 ) corresponds to typical planning efforts 
before execution. Under this condition, the plan's quality and the knowledge on the SIF's 
are both limited. Hence, the plan's quality for the execution is at 50% likelihood (i.e., there 
is a 50% chance of WAI matching WAD). Accordingly, in the causal network, all SIF's 
remain at a 50% likelihood of occurrence (e.g., a workload = 50% means there is a 50% 
chance it is commensurate with the capability of the team). With no tests performed, the 
safety outcome is significant (i.e., accident = 65.1% means a 65.1% chance an accident 
will occur during execution).  It shall be noticed this value is relatively high due to the 
absence of mitigants in the model. Had the mitigation measures been left in the model, the 
likelihood of accidents would be well under 5%. These nodes were purposely removed for 
a more precise measurement of the effects of influencing factors on accidents.  
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With more planning efforts performed before execution, the probability of 
accidents continuously decreases (with the lowest value observed at 60.04%). On the other 
hand, additional assessment of the conditions before execution improves the plan's quality 
(i.e., increased 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷)). This quality continuously improves until reaching levels 
of 86.7% (when all 11 SIF's are investigated). It shall be noticed that the quality of the plan 
increases at different rates based on the relative importance (weights) of the SIF's. 
The improvement in the plan's quality (Δ = 36.7%) resulting from testing SIF's is 
considered the maximum potential in the case study. However, the natural variability in 
human-performed activities suggests not all planning efforts will be efficient. Therefore, 
the highest quality of the plan is considered reachable as long as tests are performed 
efficiently and all produce confirming results. 
6.2 Effect of Planning on Execution Cost 
In the analysis of cost outcomes of execution, the plan's quality is integrated into 
the decision tree in two forms: (1) Prior 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) and (2) Pre-posterior 
𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷). The "Prior" form represents the a priori knowledge about the plan's 
quality. This knowledge level becomes final when no further planning is pursued, 
rendering this decision's expected monetary value. The "Pre-Posterior" form, on the other 
hand, represents the knowledge level reached after conducting further planning, and it is 
expressed as an updated quality of the plan. Accordingly, the updated (revised) quality of 
the plan will produce a different expected monetary value of such a decision. As observed 
in Figure 6.2, combinations of "Prior" and "Pre-Posterior" knowledge levels were tested 




With a cost of additional planning equal to 50% of the original planning budget 
(Line Item 1 of Table 3 ($344.3 x 0.5 = $172.15)), the maintenance of a PSV was analyzed. 
Under these conditions, the absence of prior knowledge or prior 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) = 0%, 
will benefit (render positive VOI) from planning if pre-posterior knowledge is at least 40%. 
A maximum VOI = $1,017.81 can be reached, but only if the planning efforts revert the 
knowledge level to a 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) = 100%. Notice an extreme case like this is 
improbable in the execution of projects or tasks; therefore, attention is given to more 
realistic “Priors” and “Pre-Posteriors”.  
Prior knowledge affects VOI depending on the region of the pre-posterior. The 
middle section in the chart (from 35 to 70%) offers a moderate but increasing VOI resulting 
from the planning alternative. However, it can be noticed for every prior knowledge level, 




























































































V A L U E  O F  I N F O R M A T I O N  ( V O I )





Figure 6. 2  VOI for Additional Planning costing 50% of the Planning Budget 
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𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) = 25% does not benefit from planning unless the efforts can improve it 
at least by 50% or make the “Pre-posterior” 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) = 75%. Because of its 
independence from the planning efforts, the EMV of the “No-Additional Planning” 
alternative remains constant. On the other hand, the EMV of the “Additional Planning” 
alternative keeps increasing (while penalized by the cost of planning) with revised “Pre-
Posterior” probabilities until it matches the “No-Additional Planning” alternative. Until 
then, no positive VOI will be observed. Similar behavior is found in other low prior 
knowledge levels, such as 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) = 10%, which needs an improvement of 
50%.  These results indicate the cost of planning can prevent potential benefits. 
6.2.1 Minimum Effective Improvement from Planning 
A planning effort requires a minimum improvement in the quality of the plan or 
𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) to create a positive VOI; however, the previous section showed the cost 
of planning efforts could not be ignored because it is determinant in creating value. This 
restrictive condition occurs because the actual cost of planning modifies the utility values 
on all outcomes in the “Additional Planning” alternative of the DT. In the PSV maintenance 
analysis (Figure 6.3), three cost levels were tested, and each produced different minimum 




6.2.1.1 Planning Effort at No Cost 
The condition refers to additional planning efforts without incurring additional 
costs. Here, quite Low-quality plans or prior  𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) ≈ 0% (unusual in project 
settings) will benefit with minimum planning efforts. In this case, the pre-posterior 
probability 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) can be as low as 1% to produce a positive VOI. Better prior 
knowledge (up to 35%) will only increase the pre−posterior probability 
requirement 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷). With prior knowledge 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) ≈ 50% (arguably 
the most common case in project settings), the necessary improvement from planning will 
be reduced to around 15% to render a positive VOI.      
6.2.1.2 Cost of Planning Effort at 50% of Original Planning Budget 
The necessary improvement for achieving positive VOI is affected when the cost 
of planning increases. Low-quality plans can only benefit from additional planning if they 
improve at least 40%. Because they come at a cost, the efforts need to be significantly 






























Prior Predictive Probability of System State
Minimum Pre-Posterior Probability Required for (+) VOI
Min P-Post Prob Required
@ Cost of Planning = 0%
Min P-Post Prob Required
@ Cost of Planning = 50%
Min P-Post Prob Required
@ Cost of Planning = 100%
Figure 6. 3  Minimum Improvement needed from Planning Efforts to render (+) VOI 
83 
 
reaches levels around 10%. From this point, the requirement continuously decreases as 
prior knowledge increases. At 50% prior knowledge, the required improvement is another 
30% to produce positive VOI. 
6.2.1.3 Cost of Planning Effort at 100% of Original Planning Budget 
When the cost of additional planning doubles the original planning budget, those 
low-quality plans are affected the most. In this situation, low-quality plans or prior 
𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) ≈ 0% require further planning efforts to be extraordinarily effective 
(around 70% improvement needed) to produce a positive VOI. Such requirement 
continuously reduces as the prior knowledge improves. At prior knowledge 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 =
𝑊𝐴𝐷) ≈ 50%  the required improvement reduces to levels around 35%. 
Finally, the combined performance of cost and safety is analyzed against planning 
intensity. In Figure 6.4, it can be observed an incremental number of planning efforts 
produced updated knowledge about the quality of the plan (pre posterior 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 =
𝑊𝐴𝐷)). If an updated knowledge is considered prior knowledge (before the subsequent 
planning effort), it renders a specific requirement for yielding a positive VOI.  As observed, 
the plot starts at 𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) = 50%, corresponding to zero tests or no-additional 
planning efforts. It shall be noticed on the cost side; the behavior follows a similar pattern 
as  Figure 6.3 with a clear point of the minimum requirement determining a practical 
boundary for efficient planning efforts. On the safety size, it can be observed the likelihood 







6.2.2 Improvement in VOI based on Category of Influencing Factors 
In execution settings (projects, maintenance activities, or repair tasks), the question 
regarding the criteria to allocate planning resources is not uncommon. The causal network's 
outer layer in the case study identifies three major categories of influencing factors: 
Organizational, Latent Conditions, and Scope of Work. In this study, a sensitivity analysis 
based on a permutation of (n) categories of influencing factors in (r) sets was conducted to 
determine the order of planning activities that has the most significant improvement in 
VOI.  Each test consists of an arrangement followed by the study of each category in a pre-
determined order (See Table 6.1).  




































Number of Tests or Planning Efforts
Requirement for Planning Efforts vs Improvement in Safety
Cost = 0% (PL-Budget)
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Table 6.1 Tests on Categories of Influencing Factors 
 
At zero cost of planning and starting with prior P(WAI=WAD)=50%, each category 
of influencing factor was sequentially tested by using their contribution to the prior 
probability. On a subsequent test, the prior P(WAI=WAD) is updated with the previous 
test's contribution. In other words, the updated probability becomes the prior probability 
(prior knowledge) for the subsequent test. A total of six tests were conducted, resulting in 
the most considerable improvements when the category of influencing factors with the 
highest weight (i.e., Organizational Factors = 21.15% out of the total 36.7%) are performed 
at last. The effect is caused by the region of "no benefit" from additional planning. Most of 
the benefits from high influencing factors on the VOI are wasted in this region. Therefore, 
even when they produce slight improvement to the VOI, low influencing factors can bring 
the priors closer to the (+) VOI region. Once near or in the benefit region, planning efforts 
benefit the VOI to the full extent. Nevertheless, because the prior knowledge is already 
high, any further planning effort may arguably be necessary. Finally, the results show when 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Test 1 
Organizational Factors Latent Conditions Scope of Work 
5.1% 2.9% 0.0% 
Test 2 
Latent Conditions Organizational Factors Scope of Work 
0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 
Test 3 
Organizational Factors Scope of Work Latent Conditions 
5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Test 4 
Scope of Work Organizational Factors Latent Conditions 
0.0% 10.3% 0.0% 
Test 5 
Scope of Work Latent Conditions Organizational Factors 
0.0% 0.6% 19.5% 
Test 6 
Latent Conditions Scope of Work Organizational Factors 
0.0% 1.2% 19.5% 
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all factors are to be exhaustively investigated,  the VOI will be maximized if the lowest 





CHAPTER VII : MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
With the methodology applied on a pseudo project,  the case study aims to provide 
project management organizations with an alternative decision-making approach. The 
central idea is to develop some practical rules to be followed when safety and cost are 
sought. Even when the study's findings must be kept in the context where they were 
obtained (pseudo projects), they still provide indicative yet valid results for projects. If 
more representative results are expected, they can be achieved with more comprehensive 
models. In such a case, data gathering and modeling efforts need to be assessed against the 
accuracy of results.  
7.2 Applicability of the Analysis Method in Construction 
The proposed method was implemented in an MMRT intervention within a process 
facility, but it can also be applied in a full-scale project setting. For this purpose, the risk 
register, activity budget, safety influencing factors, and the NPT’s in the causal network 
must be developed with input from the project team. A refinement in the steps of the 
analysis can potentially bring the benefit of increased accuracy in the likelihood of 
accidents and the value of information. However, alongside, it could diminish the interest 
of project team members. Complex or lengthy analysis methods run the risk of not being 
utilized in the field (such as construction environments); therefore, applying the method 
would require a balance between accuracy and applicability. Starting with a high-level risk 
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register and budget to be used with a simple DT and BBN would set the pace for 
progressive adoption of the method.   
As observed in risk management maturity models, the refinement and adoption of 
new methods are expected to be progressive  (Hillson, 1997; Oliva, 2016). The proposed 
method is no different and calls for the progressive addition of granularity to the analysis. 
Although volume is a qualifier of data, these improvements shall focus on quality as 
opposed to quantity of information. Once the project organization is aware of its 
capabilities to capture and report relevant data for analysis, the desired maturity level could 
be selected and pursued.   
7.3 Managerial Influence on the Analysis 
The intermediate layer of the proposed model is represented by a causal network 
made of influencing factors that require proper identification. As presented in the model, 
the causal network's outer layer is a hierarchy of influencing factors that are expected to be 
identified by the execution team. However, factors within this hierarchy may not always 
be identifiable because such information may be restrictive to some project team members. 
Examples of the limitation include governing documents such as Organizational Strategic 
Plans, Project Services contracts for Engineering and Construction, Surety Documents, 
Procurement Plans, and Commissioning Plans. Therefore, an upper management 
commitment to safety can overcome the problem of access to information in two possible 
forms: 
1) A direct involvement with the identification and assessment of the safety 
influencing factors.  
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2) An open information policy that allows document controls to grant access to 
any team member involved in the assessment of safety. 
With these measures in place, the project execution team would gain a better 
understanding of the procedural and contractual conditions surrounding the execution and, 
consequently, identify influencing factors and enhance the quality of results. 
7.4 Management Experience to Improve Safety and Reduce Cost 
In construction, it isn't easy to replace the project manager's experience 
(Gharehbaghi & McManus, 2003). Construction project organizations rely (heavily) on the 
manager's experience, who is expected to conduct the project in a safe and cost-efficient 
way. However, relevant experience is gained over time and includes failures that turn into 
lessons learned. Modern and efficient project organizations cannot afford managers to fail 
for the benefit of a gained experience. The method (and case study) is intended to close the 
experience gap further. Rather than replacing the construction manager's criteria to make 
decisions, the method is intended to help gather and organize data that can be converted 
into valuable knowledge for running the project.   
The case study results are mostly indicative but make a case for planning as able to 
produce an additional benefit (beyond controlling cost, duration, and scope) in 
construction. The study results prove that execution safety is improved with further 
planning efforts. Like many probabilistic approaches, the presented method needs to be 





7.5 Maximizing the Value of Planning in Construction 
The value of planning has been characterized by improvements in the probability 
of accidents and the expected monetary value of information. The case study showed 
obtaining value is possible at any level of uncertainty. Nevertheless, for the findings to help 
manage construction projects (or interventions), it is necessary to explain them to avoid 
ambiguity in the interpretation. Therefore, two of the most relevant guides for the 
assessment of further planning as an alternative are: 
a) Planning is a good decision if the level of uncertainty about the quality of 
the plan falls between 50% and 70% 
When the quality of a plan in hands (based on current knowledge) is at the point 
of maximum uncertainty (50%), further planning allows for benefits in safety 
and expected execution cost at a moderate cost of planning. However, at 70% 
uncertainty (almost ¾ of total certainty), the planning value can be reached at 
the lowest cost. Therefore, the 50 - 70% range can be considered the best value 
region for further planning efforts (see Figure 7.1). In practice, the upper end of 
this range can be recognized as halfway between maximum uncertainty at 50%  





b) Planning is a good decision if performed on 40% of all identified 
influencing factors 
Once management has a reasonable estimate of the number of influencing 
factors that might affect the safety of the execution, it becomes clear that going 
after every single one would produce the maximum improvement in safety. 
Nevertheless, the planning efforts to remain cost-effective need to be applied to 
40% of the factors. (See Figure 7.2). Planning efforts on more than 40% of the 
factors imply an increased usage of project resources with a higher expectation 
of their results. 
0%                                50%                      100% 
Degree of confidence on the 
Quality of the Execution Plan 
70%            
Figure 7. 1 Simplified Representation of the Uncertainty Region that        



























Figure 7. 2 Simplified Representation of the Region with Safety & Cost-
Efficient Planning Efforts 
0%                                50%                      100% 
Percentage of Identified Safety 
Influencing Factors 
 

























CHAPTER V : SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
5.1 Summary 
The effect of additional planning was studied in the socio-technical system of 
MMRT interventions to find optimum levels that render economic value and yet improve 
safety. An approach that integrates project planning with cost and safety outcomes provides 
the means to understand the relationship between these two aspects. The fundamental 
similarities with regular projects (scope, duration, and cost) allowed MMRT interventions 
in process plants to be studied as small-scale or pseudo projects. The analysis demonstrates 
effective planning efforts during MMRT interventions can reduce the likelihood of 
accidents and improve the expected cost of execution.  
5.2 Conclusions 
1. The relationship between cost and safety outcomes of execution in MMRT 
interventions can be studied using causal network analysis. Bayesian methods 
allow flexibility to account for any factor in an STS. Despite the difficulties with 
the assignment of data-driven probabilities in the node probability tables (NPT's), 
the method allows subjective judgment of probabilities. 
2. The decision to pursue additional information before an MMRT intervention (as 
depicted in the Project Cost Layer) directly influences the BBN. Additional 
information reshapes the risk profile on the parent nodes (outer layer of the STS). 
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The relationship between cost and safety is established only when the execution 
team elects to pursue further information about surrounding conditions (e.g., 
procedures, documentation, work methods, job site conditions, and laborer's 
workload).  
3. Safety outcomes measured in terms of the probability of incidents/accidents can be 
influenced by additional information. Updated information propagates through the 
BBN from parent nodes (SIF's) down to the incident/accident node. The acquired 
knowledge (through additional planning efforts to reveal current conditions) 
reduces the likelihood of accidents during execution. 
4. Prior knowledge about the STS (expressed as the quality of plan in hand) and the 
cost of planning affect the VOI. The case study showed minimum planning efforts 
render economic value in the long run if they represent no additional cost. Higher 
costs of planning demand significant improvements in uncertainty reduction. For 
an execution team with a low-quality plan or  𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) ≈ 0% (i.e., the 
execution plan is either entirely faulted or inexistent), further planning must stay 
within the original planning budget (no extra cost for additional planning). By doing 
so, it will still be able to improve safety and render long-run economic value. 
5. A moderate quality of plan  𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) ≈ 50% (arguably the point of 
maximum uncertainty) changes the requirements. Planning efforts need to improve 
the quality of the plan between 15% (for no-cost planning) and 35% (for the cost 
of planning around twice the original planning budget).  As explained in the 
"Managerial Implications of the Study", moderate quality of plan suggests even re-
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doing the planning work can benefit safety and cost; however, higher expectations 
are imposed on such rework. 
6. An enhanced quality of the plan  𝑃(𝑊𝐴𝐼 = 𝑊𝐴𝐷) ≈ 70% defines the lowest 
necessary improvement from planning efforts (Figure 6.3). Regardless of the cost 
of planning, minimum efforts can produce a positive VOI at this level of 
uncertainty. However, this quality of plan may be considered enough to proceed 
with work and avoid dedicating resources to further planning. Consequently, the 
project team shall assess whether the plan's quality falls within the 50% - 70% range 
to get the most value out of further planning efforts. 
7. Between 4 and 5 (out of 11) influencing factors outlined the region with the lowest 
necessary improvement from planning efforts (Figure 6.4). These factors, once 
investigated and controlled, define an efficiency boundary. Consequently, the 
project team shall aim to do planning on 35% to 40% of all identified influencing 
factors to get the most value out of further planning efforts. 
5.3 Further Research 
1. The application of the proposed method in large-scope interventions in process 
plants (e.g., installation of gas compressors, distillation towers, and catalytic 
crackers) would better reflect the socio-technical conditions of regular size projects 
leading to findings more meaningful for the construction project management 
discipline.   
2. The present analysis was performed on a pseudo project with input from graduate 
students. Hence, input from an actual project team shall be considered optimal in 
developing the DT and causal network.  The suitability of analysis tools (i.e., risk 
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register and NPT’s) would be enhanced if elaborated by a real execution team. As 
a consequence, results would be more representative of real projects. 
3. The cost outcome of execution was represented in the proposed model as the 
expected value of information (VOI); however, further research should consider 
alternative indicators familiar to construction project management practitioners. 
These indicators may include the Estimate-At-Completion (EAC) and the Cost 
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APPENDIX A –  CASE STUDY RISK REGISTER AND HEAT MAP 
 
 Risk Statement  
Current Residual Risk    
Risk 
 No. 
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PROBABILITY 
     0-5% 5-20% 20-50% 50-80% 80-100%      
     1 2 3 4 5 
  












          
4 4 (H) 
50% - 100% of 
Budget 
50 - 100% of 
Execution Time 
        CRITICAL 
3 3 (M) 
20% to 50% of 
Budget 
20 - 50% of 
Execution Time 
      SEVERE   
2 2 (L) 
10% to 20% of 
Budget 
10 - 20% of 
Execution Time 
    MATERIAL     
1 1 (VL) 








APPENDIX B  – CASE STUDY DECISION TREE TO ESTIMATE THE VOI  







APPENDIX C – DEFINITION OF THE CASE SUDY BBN NODES AND 
CORRESPONDING STATES 




State 1 Yes 
Time allocation is typical to the type and conditions of the 
work/task. 
Available time allocated to the 
completion of a task State 2 No 
Time allocation is insufficient to the type and conditions of the work. 





State 1 Yes Team members are motivated 
The willingness of the 
execution team to perform the 
assigned task 
State 2 No 
Team members lack reasons for acting or behaving in a productive 




State 1 Yes 
The assigned amount of work is commensurate with available 
resources (people, equipment and materials) 
The amount of work to be 
performed by the execution 
team 
State 2 No 
 Available resources (people, equipment and materials) are not 




State 1 Yes The documents exist and execution team is aware of its contents 
Documentation regarding the 
lines of responsibility and 
authority over the entire 
operation  
State 2 No 
The documents do not exist, are incomplete or its contents are not 




State 1 Yes 
Tech documents are available and execution team is aware of its 
contents 
Specifications and drawings 
(e.g., P&ID's)  needed for 
proper procedural intervention  
State 2 No 
Tech documents do not exist, are incomplete or contents are not fully 




State 1 Yes Execution team is mostly qualified to perform the work 
Training for execution and 
allocation of resources based 
on skills 




State 1 Yes 
Organization maintains integral and continuous communication with 
its personnel 
Level of broad organizational 
communications (general 
management)  
State 2 No 
Organization fails to maintain full or continuous communication 
with its personnel 
8 
Safety of Machinery & 
Process 
LATC1 
State 1 Yes Machinery is safe to perform activities 
Adequacy and condition of 
machinery (including machine 
safety equipment) 
State 2 No Machinery is not safe to perform activities 
9 
Adequacy of Workplace 
Design 
LATC2 
State 1 Yes Occupational hygiene and working surfaces are adequate 
Workplace conditions 
including occupational hygiene 
& working surfaces  




State 1 Small Amount of work is below the assigned workload 
Amount of work to be 
performed by the execution 
team 
State 2 Typical Amount of work meets the assigned workload 




State 1 Low Work to be performed shows low or no complexity  
Level of complexity in the 
work to be done 
State 2 Typical Work to be performed shows typical complexity  
State 3 High Work to be performed shows high complexity  
12 
Hazard ID Capability 
SCOW3 
State 1 Yes 
Execution team is able to identify all hazards all hazards associated 
to the execution of the task 
Execution team's capability to 
recognize hazards associated to 
the performance of work 
State 2 No 
Execution team is not able to fully identify all hazards associated to 




State 2 No No mistakes are made during execution of work 
Judgmental errors or failure of 
interpretation of procedures  










State 2 No No violations occur during execution 
Deliberate (but not necessarily 
reprehensible) deviation from 
those practices deemed 
necessary by designers, 
managers and regulatory 
agencies. 
State 1 Yes A violation occurs during execution 
15 
Slips & Lapses 
HUER3 
State 2 No No Slip /Lapses occur during the execution of the work 
Unintended deviation from 
practices recommended in the 
formal procedures 




State 1 Yes Supervision for the task exists and is effective 
Control of the engineering, 
process, environmental 
requirements for an adequate 
& safe execution of the work 




State 1 Yes The work permit (PTW) is complete 
Level of detail of the work to 
be performed and hazard ID as 
shown in the Permit-to-Work 




State 1 Yes Control measures are exercised on the performed task 
Ability to influence proper 
execution and avoidance of 
human error by means of 
supervision and proper work 
permit 
State 2 No 





State 1 Yes Safety measures are identified and implemented in the PTW 
Safety measures identified and 
incorporated in the Permit-to-
Work system 
State 2 No 
Safety measures are not identified or they are identified but not 




State 1 Yes Accident/incident occurs 
Accident or Incident 
occurrence during the 
execution of task 










APPENDIX D – ESTIMATION OF PROBABILITIES IN THE NPT FOR NODE: 
“SLIPS & LAPSES” 
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APPENDIX F – CASE STUDY FINAL BBN FOR THE PSV MAINTENANCE 
(CONDITIONED OR INSTANTIATED NETWORK) 
 
 
 
 
